Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 1 Winter 2015

Article 1

January 2015

The Tyranny of Plastics: How Society of Plastics, Inc. v. County of
Suffolk Prevents New Yorkers from Protecting Their Environment
and How They Could Be Liberated from Its Unreasonable Standing
Requirements
Albert K. Butzel
Albert K. Butzel Law Offices

Ned Thimmayya
Albert K. Butzel Law Offices

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Natural Resources Law
Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Albert K. Butzel and Ned Thimmayya, The Tyranny of Plastics: How Society of Plastics, Inc. v.
County of Suffolk Prevents New Yorkers from Protecting Their Environment and How They
Could Be Liberated from Its Unreasonable Standing Requirements, 32 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 1
(2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

1_Butzel&Thimmayya

8/24/2015 12:03 PM

Final REVISED

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Volume 32

Winter 2015

Number 1

ARTICLE
The Tyranny of Plastics:
How Society of Plastics, Inc. v. County of
Suffolk Prevents New Yorkers from
Protecting Their Environment and How They
Could Be Liberated from Its Unreasonable
Standing Requirements
ALBERT K. BUTZEL & NED THIMMAYYA*

I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Court of Appeals of New York issued its
holding in the landmark case Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v.
County of Suffolk, citizen oversight of government-approved and
government projects with environmental implications has
suffered curtailment inconsistent with the objectives of the State
* Albert K. Butzel is the principal of Albert K. Butzel Law Offices in New
York City. He has litigated a number of standing cases in both Federal and
State courts, including the seminal case of Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), and most
recently, under New York law, Allison v. New York City Landmarks
Preservation Commission, 944 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
Ned Thimmayya is of counsel at Albert K. Butzel Law Offices. Thimmayya's
environmental law blog can be found at www.courtscatscarbon.com.
The authors would like to thank Michael Gerrard and Michael Gruen for
their comments on drafts of this article.
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Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). At the center of the
conflict between SEQRA and citizen enforcement are the
restrictive standing requirements formulated by Society of
Plastics, which include the demand that a petitioner demonstrate
harm distinct from injury to the general public. Not only does
such a prerequisite for consideration of a case’s merits ignore the
interrelatedness of local environmental conditions with larger
regional trends, but also insulates from judicial review
widespread environmental damages that injure the public.
Beyond New York, numerous other states have developed
standing doctrines that more capably match the purposes of their
environmental protection acts and address the ecological
complexities of environmental harms yet also prevent frivolous
complaints from disrupting judicial efficiency. New York State,
through the example set by other jurisdictions and through
recognizing the unreasonable outcomes of post-Society of Plastics
cases is well situated to reform its environmental standing
doctrine through judicial action or legislation. This article will
first outline the current status of citizen standing to enforce
SEQRA in Part II; then III) highlight the manner in which New
York’s standing doctrine has diverged from SEQRA’s goals; IV)
examine more effective environmental standing doctrines in other
states; V) suggest precedent New York courts could utilize to
correct New York’s defective standing requirements; and, finally,
VI) offer a legislative solution to the deficiency of the standing
requirements engendered by Society of Plastics.
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF CITIZEN STANDING
IN NEW YORK STATE
SEQRA is the primary New York State law used for
monitoring government-permitted and government projects that
could have a substantial impact on the environment.1 Article 78
of the New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules (NYCPLR)

1. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8 (McKinney 2013); see generally J.
Andrew Williams, Society of Plastics Industry v. County of Suffolk: New Barriers
to SEQRA Standing in New York, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 152, 154-58 (1993)
(summarizing SEQRA-mandated processes, including preparation of an
environmental impact statement (EIS)).
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provides a mechanism to challenge a government agency’s
compliance with SEQRA.2 However, an individual or group
qualifies to bring suit only if it has “standing”: a legal interest in
the subject matter of the action that is recognized by the courts.3
The current standing test for petitioners initiating Article 78
proceedings to compel compliance with SEQRA was set forth in
Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. County of Suffolk.4 In order to
establish Article 78 standing, an individual petitioner must show
that he or she 1) suffers actual injury (so-called “injury-in-fact” as
a result of the action he or she complains of); 2) the injury must
be distinct from the impact on the public as a whole; and 3) the
injury must fall within the zone of interests protected by
In the “area of associational or organizational
SEQRA.5
standing” to challenge actions under SEQRA, Society of Plastics
held that one or more members of the organization must have
standing to sue (“standing cannot be achieved by merely
multiplying the persons a group purports to represent”);6 the
organization must show that the interests it purports to
represent are “germane to its purposes so as to satisfy the court
that it is an appropriate representative of those interests;” 7 and
finally that “neither the asserted claim nor the appropriate relief
requires the participation of the individual members.”8
Recently, Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Common Council of
Albany altered the manner in which the above standing tests are
applied to a suit, at least with respect to organizational standing.
While many post-Society of Plastics courts suggested that injury
2. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. Art. 78 (McKinney 2011).
3. See Soc’y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034,
1038 (N.Y. 1991).
4. See id. at 1039-42. Of forty-four SEQRA cases heard by the Court of
Appeals, only six have been split decisions, one of which was Society of Plastics.
Michael B. Gerrard, Standing Under SEQRA: 'Progeny of Society of Plastics
Industry,' N.Y. L.J, Nov. 22, 2002, at 3.
5. See Soc’y of Plastics, 573 N.E.2d at 1041.
6. Id. at 1042.
7. Id. at 1041 (“[T]he requirement that a petitioner's injury fall within the
concerns the Legislature sought to advance or protect by the statute assures
that groups whose interests are only marginally related to, or even inconsistent
with, the purposes of the statute cannot use the courts to further their own
purposes at the expense of the statutory purposes.”).
8. Id. at 1042.
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distinct from the public depends on a petitioner’s close proximity
to a permitted project,9 Save the Pine Bush declared that a
petitioner’s proximity is not essential to establish the special
harm prong of the standing test, and that regular use of a
resource for recreation or similar activity may be sufficient.10
III.PROBLEMS WITH STANDING UNDER SEQRA
The purposes of SEQRA,11 as stated in the statute, do not
suggest or impose any limits on who should be able to challenge
9. Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1238 (N.Y.
1996). See also Saratoga Lake Prot. & Imp. Dist. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works of
Saratoga Springs, 846 N.Y.S.2d 786, 791 (App. Div. 2007); Comm. to Pres.
Brighton Beach & Manhattan Beach, Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of N.Y., 695
N.Y.S.2d 7, 12 (App. Div. 1999).
10. Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Common Council of Albany, 918 N.E.2d 917,
921 (N.Y. 2009) (“However Society of Plastics does not hold or suggest, that
residence close to a challenged project is an indispensible element of standing in
every environmental case.”); see also Mary A. Chertok & Ashley S. Miller,
Environmental Law: Developments in the Law of SEQRA, 2009, 60 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 925, 930 (2010) (explaining how Save the Pine Bush diverged from postSociety of Plastics courts' proximity emphasis). A petitioner able to show close
proximity may nevertheless be able to fulfill the special harm prong without a
further showing of distinct injury. Gernatt Asphalt Prods., 664 N.E.2d at 1238
(“A nearby property owner may have standing to challenge a proposed zoning
change because aggrievement may be inferred from proximity.” (citing Sun-Brite
Car Wash v. Bd. of Zoning & Appeals, 508 N.E.2d 130, 131 (1987))). Where the
subject of a SEQRA challenge is not a zoning change adjacent to or
encompassing property belonging to the petitioner, however, close proximity
may be insufficient in and of itself to establish standing. Rather proximity may
only be sufficient to the extent the injury-inducing project is visible from the
vantage point of the plaintiff's property. See Matt Dulak, What's It To You?
Citizen Challenges to Landmark Preservation Decisions and the Special Damage
Requirement, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 447 (2013) (challenging the special harm rule
in the context of landmark preservation cases).
11. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney 2013). The purpose of
SEQRA is:
to declare a state policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and enhance human and community resources; and to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems, natural, human and
community resources important to the people of the state.
Id. See also Joan Leary Matthews, Unlocking the Courthouse Doors: Removal of
the “Special Harm” Requirement Under SEQRA, 65 ALB. L. REV. 421, 457 (2001)
(“SEQRA—with its broad definition of environment, low threshold for requiring
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government findings that violate the statute. In fact, the
limitations are court derived. The current Society of Plastics test,
even as refined by Save the Pine Bush, has led to inconsistent
results for standing determinations and therefore hinders the
effectiveness of SEQRA.12 In fact, New York’s standing test
under SEQRA “has no parallel in either federal standing law or
the laws of most other states, and thus makes New York one of
the most restrictive jurisdictions for environmental plaintiffs.”13
In contrast to the preoccupation with special harm fermented
by case law,14 the purposes of SEQRA are general and oriented
towards public interest. The Act speaks to protecting the
the preparation of an environmental impact statement, and its action-forcing
measures—held enormous promise when it was first enacted.”).
12. See Philip Weinberg, SEQRA: Effective Weapon – If Used as Directed, 65
ALB. L. REV. 315 (2001).
SEQRA is, in the end, only as effective as New York’s courts will
allow it to be. A string of early court rulings soon after SEQRA’s
enactment ensured its vitality by enjoining projects and vacating
permits where agencies had ignored SEQRA by failing to write EISs
or to consider alternatives or mitigation measures. However, . . .
[Society of Plastics] unduly limited the ability of citizens to obtain
legal standing in court to question agencies’ compliance with
SEQRA.
Id. at 320. See generally Matthews, supra note 11, at 422-23 (comparing SEQRA
with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the federal equivalent of
SEQRA, positing that SEQRA’s standing requirements are far more “stringent
and preclusive” and describing the ensuing harm caused by these requirements).
13. Michael B. Gerrard, Judicial Review Under SEQRA: A Statistical Study,
65 ALB. L. REV. 365, 372 (2001). See also id. at 379 (“The essence of the holding
of the nearly 2000 SEQRA decisions can be boiled down to one sentence: If an
agency identifies the relevant areas of concern, writes them up in moderate
detail, takes action consistent with the write-up, and follows the procedures
reasonably closely, the agency is highly likely to eventually win any SEQRA
lawsuit brought against it.”).
14. Historically, the special harm requirement, or the "different-in-kind" test,
is actually a distortion of the older "difference-in-degree" test whereby courts
determined standing based on the severity of an injury rather than the more
restrictive criterion demanding that a petitioner suffer a unique injury. See
generally Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing the Public Nuisance: Solving the
Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755 (2001). The special
harm requirement later emerged in England during the Industrial Revolution
when Parliament sought to insulate railroad companies from duplicitous suits.
These "railroad cases" were based on Parliament's acts rather than common law.
See id. (describing the origins of the special harm rule, and how, specifically in
the context of public nuisance actions, it has hindered legal actions beneficial to
the public).
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environment generally.15 The purposes of the Act emphasize the
broad public environmental concerns of the state, thus suggesting
that environmental threats across the state are interrelated and
that environmental well-being is a concern of the “people of the
state.”16 Section 8-103(2) of SEQRA more specifically reveals the
incompatibility of SEQRA and a special harm requirement,
declaring that “[e]very citizen has a responsibility to contribute to
the preservation and enhancement of the quality of the
environment.”17
The special harm requirement laid down in Society of Plastics
has clearly prevented injured plaintiffs from seeking redress
under SEQRA. In Long Island Pine Barrens Society, Inc. v.
Planning Board of Town of Brookhaven, plaintiffs sought to
demonstrate that a construction project would negatively affect
the ground water in an area that had been designated as a
protected ground water area.18 The protected ground water area
consisted of the “sole source aquifer” for many Long Island
residents, and yet such residents did not have standing to sue
because “so many” would suffer a similar harm, and thus they
were unable to allege special harm.19 Long Island Pine Barrens
demonstrates an ironic impact of the Society of Plastics test:
projects entailing the most widespread environmental harm are
often unchallengeable because there will be “too many” affected
members of the public to achieve standing.20
15. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney 2013) (SEQRA’s general
purpose is to “encourage . . . harmony between man and his environment,”
“prevent or eliminate damage to the environment,” and “to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems, natural, human and community
resources important to the people of the state”).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 8-0103(2).
18. Long Island Pine Barrens Soc’y, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Brookhaven, 623
N.Y.S.2d 613 (App. Div. 1995).
19. Matthews, supra note 11, at 456.
20. See Philip Weinberg, Unbarring the Bar of Justice: Standing in
Environmental Suits and the Constitution, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 27, 49 (2003)
(describing how dissenting judges in Society of Plastics warned that the
majority's holding “effectively barred challenging environmental injury suffered
by all area residents, unless the plaintiff can show injury unique to itself”). The
United States Supreme Court has highlighted the dangerous impact of a special
harm requirement where environmental damage is concerned: “[t]o deny
standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also
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The special harm requirement has prevented environmental
organizations from protecting the very interests for which they
were established and pursuing the missions for which they are
maintained. In Otsego 2000, Inc. v. Planning Board of Town of
Oswego, the court held a non-profit entity “organized for
charitable purposes which include the preservation and
promotion of the natural beauty, wholesome environment and
varied economic landscape of the Otsego Lake region” did not
have standing to “obtain judicial review of administrative
actions.”21 The court held that Otsego 2000 (the non-profit
plaintiff) failed to allege injury distinct from that of the general
injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government
actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion.”
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 688 (1973). Furthermore, The grievously debilitating effect of the special
harm requirement was not lost upon the dissent in Society of Plastics:
Under the new standard, someone who alleges environmental
damage from an action which applies generally to an entire area and
indiscriminately affects everyone in the area is precluded from
judicial review. Because such environmental damage is by its very
nature undifferentiated and shared by all, the objector cannot show
special damage that is different from that of the public at large. The
rule, as it is employed here, can thus present a virtual impasse to
judicial review.
The majority's imposition of this extra standing requirement marks
a decided change in the course of the Court's carefully developed
jurisprudence in interpreting and implementing SEQRA since its
enactment 15 years ago. It denotes an apparent lessening in what
has been recognized as this Court's “powerful commitment to the
goal of SEQRA.” As I believe will be demonstrated, the majority's
rationale for it does not withstand critical analysis. Moreover,
because it can operate to shield cases of clearly insufficient SEQRA
compliance from judicial review-as it does here-the new “special
damage” rule does not serve the public interest or further the
important policies embraced by the Legislature in its enactment of
SEQRA.
Finally, the majority's decision to erect this additional barrier to
standing is at odds with the more open-handed approach to standing
assumed by New York courts in recent years and our recognition
that the “fundamental tenet of our system of remedies is that when a
government agency seeks to act in a manner adversely affecting a
party, judicial review of that action may be had.
Soc’y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1049 (N.Y.
1991) (Hancock Jr., J., dissenting).
21. Otsego 2000, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Oswego, 575 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585-87
(App. Div. 1991).
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public.22
Furthermore, the court discussed Otsego 2000’s
membership qualifications, which, the court noted, did not
include a membership fee or formal application process.23
Therefore, the court questioned whether the organization actually
represented those individuals listed on its membership list.24
Otsego 2000 illustrates the formidable standing barriers
facing non-profit environmental organizations seeking to compel
review of administrative decisions under SEQRA. The
implications for indigent citizens seem particularly harsh since
the court suggested that the free and simple membership
enrollment process of Otsego 2000 weighed against its standing to
sue. Since the court also noted none of Otsego 2000’s members
owned property abutting the project site,25 the decision highlights
the increased subordination of the public’s environmental
concerns beneath the individual property owner’s. Environmental
organizations seeking to contest environmentally destructive
decisions, according to the Otsego 2000 court, cannot contest
administrative actions that are inherently damaging to the
broader environment. Instead, the decision suggests that
environmental harms must be attached to a petitioner’s private
interests through ownership of adjacent property or special
harm.26 As discussed above and in conflict with Otsego 2000’s
outcome, SEQRA is intended to protect the environmental
concerns of the “people of the state,” not individuals experiencing
harm different from the “people of the state.”27 Additionally, if
environmental organizations possessing the financial resources to
contest an administrative decision are prevented from doing so,
there may be no financially viable plaintiff who is able to survive
the standing test.28 Of course such limitations are especially
22. Id. at 586.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney 2013).
28. See Williams, supra note 1, at 171 (“Another concern is the inability of a
directly affected local plaintiff to gather the resources necessary to make a
SEQRA challenge. While a well-financed organizational plaintiff may be shut
out because of the need to show direct harm, the local plaintiff who can show
direct harm may not have the financial means to engage in litigation.”).
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prohibitive for poor communities seeking to maintain healthy
environments in the face of government-approved development
plans.29
In some cases governed by the Society of Plastics’ standing
test, even owners of property abutting impacted land or water
cannot convince a court to consider the merits of their claims. In
Schulz v. Warren County Board of Supervisors, the owners of
property on Lake George challenged the Warren County Board of
Supervisors’ acceptance of a Final EIS regarding a sewage system
proposed for a town also located on Lake George.30 Rather than
recognize that sewage projects undertaken by a town on the lake
might impact the lake’s water and therefore waterside properties
beyond the town’s boundaries, the court refused to examine the
petitioners’ allegations of “increased runoff pollution” and
“degradation of the quality of the waters of Lake George, which
the petitioners allegedly use for drinking, boating, fishing and
swimming.”31 The court’s reasoning rested on its determination
that “the lake is a public body of water and [petitioners’]
allegations are merely generalized claims of harm no different in
kind or degree from the public at large.”32 Ownership of property
on the lake seemed to carry no persuasive weight in Schulz
despite the Otsego 2000 court’s insinuations that property
ownership could tilt the balance in favor of petitioners.33
Society of Plastics, as clarified by Pine Bush, has stifled
concerned citizens in cases far more recent than Schulz. In
29. As an epilogue to discussion of Otsego 2000, the reader should note that
the court did not provide the petitioner leave to amend its complaint, in contrast
to the US Supreme Court’s position in Sierra Club v. Morton. Otsego 2000, 575
N.Y.S.2d at 586-87; but see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (U.S.1972).
Though the opinion indicates the decision did not “insulate the government from
judicial review,” no judicial review of the administrative process in Otsego 2000
has since taken place. Otsego 2000, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87.
30. See Schulz v. Warren Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 614 N.Y.S.2d 809-10 (App.
Div. 1994).
31. Id. at 811.
32. Id.
33. In Bolton v. Town of Bristol Planning Board, the court echoed Schulz by
holding that a petitioner owning property on a lake targeted for development
cannot establish special harm by virtue of owning property on the impacted
lake. Bolton v. Town of Bristol Planning Bd., 832 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (App. Div.
2007).
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Saratoga Lake Protection and Improvement District v.
Department of Public Works of Saratoga Springs, the court
determined that the Town of Saratoga and the Town of Stillwater
lacked standing to challenge the Department of Public Works’
SEQRA findings.34 Both towns alleged that “loss of opportunities
for lake recreation,” “continued suburbanization,” and “loss of
wetlands,” among other injuries, would result from a
development plan to draw potable water from Saratoga Lake.35
The court found that the town’s “generalized claims of harm have
failed to identify any specific, direct environmental harm to the
Towns’ personal or property rights, either personally or in a
representative capacity, that differs from that of the public at
large,” and thus failed to fulfill the Society of Plastics special
harm prong.36 The public, as represented by its municipal
government, was refused justice before consideration of the
merits. Harm to the Town’s personal or property rights should
not have been at issue considering the broad scope of SEQRA and
its focus on the environmental well-being of the “people of the
state.”37
In East End Property Co., LLC v. Town Board of Brookhaven,
petitioners were denied standing in what was a prototypical case
of industrial ruination perpetrated upon a helpless community.38
The petitioners alleged that the Town Board of Brookhaven had
made an “arbitrary and capricious” decision in approving
construction of a power plant (the Caithness Project) after it had
previously refused such approval.39 The plaintiffs alleged in their
appellate brief that:
[a]s the record below conclusively established, barely weeks after
rejecting SEQRA Findings necessary to approve the Special
Permit and zoning variances and waivers on June 6, 2006, the
Town Board members held a “re-vote” on July 25, 2006 to
34. See Saratoga Lake Prot. & Improvement Dist. v. Dep't of Pub. Works of
Saratoga Springs, 846 N.Y.S.2d 786, 791-92 (App. Div. 2010).
35. Id. at 792.
36. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney 2013).
38. See E. End Prop. Co. v. Town Bd. of Brookhaven, 868 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App.
Div. 2008).
39. Id. at 267.
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approve SEQRA certification, upon the same environmental
record, and without any intervening change in the environmental
character or impacts of the Caithness Plant (other than an
intervening increase in the amount paid by the applicant and
LIPA via the “Community Benefits Package”).40

Nevertheless the court determined that the petitioners,
which included civic associations, the owners of a nearby housing
complex, and individual residents, did not have standing to enjoin
the special permit, variance, and waiver granted by the Town to
facilitate the Caithness Project because the petitioners did not
sufficiently allege “injury which is in some way different from
that of the public at large.”41 The court came to this conclusion
despite the power plant’s 170 foot-high exhaust stack (“more than
fifty feet” over the zoning ordinance’s permitted height), an
eighty-foot high building (thirty feet above the permitted height),
and the building’s “[fifteen]-acre ‘footprint.’ “42 The petitioners
also alleged that the environmental review overseen by the Long
Island Power Authority did not even include a new twenty-two
mile gas pipeline that would be necessary for the operation of the
power plant.43 Finally, the petitioners indicated “the Project
[would] have an adverse impact on land use, flora, fauna,
terrestrial ecology, noise, traffic, air quality, water quality and
quantity, human health, aesthetics, community and neighborhood
character and property values, causing environmental and
economic harm to Petitioners and the residents of Atlantic

40. Brief for Petitioners-Plaintiffs/Respondents-Cross-Appellants at 3-4, E.
End Prop. Co., 868 N.Y.S.2d 264 (No. 2007-05041), 2008 WL 5599985, at *4-5. It
is worth noting that the Town Board’s reversal of its decision coincided with the
power plant operator and Long Island Power Authority’s intervening donation of
$151 million dollars to the town (“The Community Benefits Package”). The
petitioners claimed the Board’s approval was expressly conditioned on receipt of
this donation. Such conditioning resulted in “unlawful and impermissible
‘contract zoning.’” See Combined Verified Petition and Complaint, E. End
Property Co., 868 N.Y.S.2d 264 (No. 2006-29696), 2006 WL 6201544.
41. E. End Prop. Co., 868 N.Y.S.2d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted)
42. See Combined Verified Petition and Complaint, supra note 40.
43. See id.
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Point,”44 all clearly falling under the umbrella of SEQRA
protections.45
As recently as 2012, in Matter of Finger Lakes Zero Waste
Coalition, Inc. v. Martens, the Finger Lakes Zero Waste Coalition
(“the Coalition”), an organization specifically organized to reduce
waste production and promote healthy air and water quality in
the Finger Lakes region, filed a complaint that was dismissed
because the Coalition failed to allege that one of its members
suffered “direct harm, injury that is in some way different from
that of the public at large.”46 Society of Plastics’ familiar mantra
trumped the organization’s interests in contesting the New York
State
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation’s
environmental assessment of a landfill permit modification.
Although one of the organization’s members lived within 4,000
feet of the landfill, alleged that she suffered increased noise and
dust from operations permitted by the modification, and was part
of a “property protection plan” designed to compensate property
owners for depreciation of property values due to the landfill, she
was still unable to establish standing because she did not “use
and enjoy” the “soil borrow” from which the County was
excavating the landfill sand.47
As the cases prove, the Society of Plastics standing test has
hampered proper application of SEQRA. SEQRA seeks to protect
the environment for the benefit of the general public. To impose
the current harsh restrictions on plaintiffs, particularly the
special harm requirement, is akin to “privatizing” the statute, the
effect of which will be to allow only monied individuals, some
parties within a few hundred feet of permitted projects, and

44. Id.
45. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105 (McKinney 2013) (“6.
‘Environment’ means the physical conditions which will be affected by a
proposed action, including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, objects
of historic or aesthetic significance, existing patterns of population
concentration, distribution, or growth, and existing community or neighborhood
character.”).
46. Finger Lakes Zero Waste Coal., Inc. v. Martens, 944 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338
(App. Div. 2012) (quoting Soc’y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573
N.E.2d 1034, 1041 (N.Y. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), appeal
denied, 976 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2012).
47. Id. at 338-39.
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parties alleging localized environmental threats, to be heard in
court.
These adverse consequences are not mere speculation. After
Society of Plastics in 1991, up until 2002, only 48% of SEQRA
cases where standing was challenged were permitted to go
forward in contrast to 68% of suits before Society of Plastics.48
The legal recourse of community groups, environmental groups,
and “neighbors of challenged projects” was particularly damaged
by Society of Plastics.49 Neighbors’ rate of prevailing in standing
challenges decreased from 85% before Society of Plastics to 50%
after it.50 Community groups and environmental organizations’
success rate fell from 67% to 33%.51 Business entities, on the
other hand, were only marginally hindered as indicated by their
comparatively modest decrease in surviving standing challenges
from 50% to 45%.52
Current judicial holdings are effectively in derogation of the
purposes of SEQRA, but they are not without cure. Numerous
other states have addressed this defect by adopting citizen suit
provisions to enforce their environmental statutes. We believe
New York should follow suit.
IV. OTHER STATES’ SOLUTIONS
Many states offer a range of alternatives to New York’s
current standing requirements. The jurisdictions discussed below
all maintain standing qualifications more appropriate to the
needs of enforcing their environmental statutes than New York
currently provides to its citizens. The states illustrating more
effective standing law may be grouped into three camps.
Historically, Michigan leads the states of the most relaxed
48. Gerrard, supra note 4, at 3, 5. Gerrard analyzed all cases concerning
standing under SEQRA considered by the New York State Appellate Division
and the Court of Appeals from 1975 (SEQRA's enactment) to 2002, which
included a total of 101 cases. Id. at 3.
49. See id. at 5.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Prior to Society of Plastics, most dismissals for lack of standing where
businesses were the petitioners are attributed to the economic nature of the
petitioners’ injuries, which do not fall within the purview of SEQRA. Id. at 3.
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persuasion, including Minnesota, Connecticut, and New Jersey.
Hawai’i and Illinois are not far behind. Of the states selected for
comparison, Florida and California contain the least liberal
standing hurdles, but these are still less inimical to public
environmental interests than New York’s standing demands.
Michigan
Michigan was the first state to pass a statutory
environmental citizen suit.53 An examination of the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act’s (MEPA’s) impact demonstrates
that citizen suits sharpen a legislative act’s ability to protect the
environment, and that courts do not become flooded by frivolous
or solely economically-concerned plaintiffs as a result of relaxed
standing requirements.
Within the first three years of the statute’s existence—MEPA
was enacted in 1970—seventy-four suits were initiated.54
Unexpectedly, many of these suits were initiated by state
agencies rather than private parties, suggesting that eased
standing requirements do not necessarily invite a slew of self53. See Joseph L. Sax & Joseph F. DiMento, Environmental Citizen Standing
Suits: Three Years Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protection
Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 1 (1974) (“The Michigan Environmental Protection Act
was the first statute to provide for citizen suits to protect the environment from
degradation by either public or private entities and to provide a broad scope for
court adjudication.”). The relevant portion of the Michigan statute provides that:
(1) The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in
the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation
occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief
against any person for the protection of the air, water, and other
natural resources and the public trust in these resources from
pollution, impairment, or destruction.
(2) In granting relief provided by subsection (1), if there is a
standard for pollution or for an antipollution device or procedure,
fixed by rule or otherwise, by the state or an instrumentality,
agency, or political subdivision of the state, the court may:
(a) Determine the validity, applicability, and reasonableness of the
standard.
(b) If a court finds a standard to be deficient, direct the adoption of a
standard approved and specified by the court.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701 (2011).
54. Sax & DiMento, supra note 53, at 6-7. This figure does not include
collateral cases, but does include condemnation cases. Id. at 7 n.20.
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interested and opportunistic litigants.55 The Wayne County
Health Department (WCHD) was the most frequent plaintiff, and
yet none of its suits went to trial.56 Rather than battle in court,
the defendants, “large industrial corporations economically able
to deal with air pollution control problems[,] apparently willing to
do so when enforcement pressures become strong enough,” and
faced with adverse publicity, opted to settle.57 Furthermore,
during the first three years, standing was not successfully
challenged in any of these suits nor did “broad standing” create
“practical problems for effective resolution of controversies.”58
Despite relaxed standing, redundant litigation has been
avoided.59
The predicted effect of stifled business and frivolous suits
appears not to have occurred. First, one-fourth of all surveyed
suits leading to injunctions targeted public projects, as opposed to
private business enterprises.60 One-third of all cases involving
injunctions were suits brought by public agencies.61 Where a
preliminary injunction was issued, two-thirds of the cases were
won by plaintiffs, thus validating their initial claims and the
ensuing injunction.62
More recently, Michigan’s citizen suit provision has been
challenged, but without abiding success. In Michigan Citizens for
Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters North America Inc., the
Supreme Court of Michigan rolled back lenient standing
requirements and adopted federal standing requirements as set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders

55. See generally id. at 23.
56. Id. at 23-4 (“[WCHD] has charge of air pollution regulation in the Detroit
metropolitan area.”).
57. Id. at 24.
58. Id. at 36.
59. Id. at 37–8 (“Once the plaintiffs either win or lose, they accept their
situation, and neither they nor others sympathetic to their claims attempt to
relitigate the same issue in a different proceeding.”). Courts have also “been
rather careful to assure that plaintiffs sue the proper parties.” Id. at 37.
60. Sax & DiMento, supra note 53, at 46.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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of Wildlife.63 The Michigan Citizens court read an implied “cases
and controversies” clause into the Michigan State Constitution.64
Yet just three years later, Lansing School’s Education
Association, MEA/NEA v. Lansing Board of Education overruled
Michigan Citizens, finding that the Michigan State Constitution
had no “cases and controversies” requirement equivalent to that
of the federal constitution and therefore the legislature and state
courts had broader leeway than federal courts in formulating
standing requirements.65 The Lansing court discussed four
criteria appropriate for evaluating whether to alter a courtcreated rule.66 Such a test is useful when considering whether to
alter the Society of Plastics standing requirements in New York
State. It is most useful to focus on the third factor that the
Lansing court considered: “whether upholding the rule is likely to
result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests.”67
Accordingly, the Lansing court held that the federal requirements
adopted in Michigan Citizens operated at “the expense of public
63. See Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am.
Inc., 737 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Mich. 2007). (“First, the plaintiff must have suffered
an ‘injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent’, not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical.’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of-the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the independent
action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as
opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable
decision.” (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d
800, 814 (Mich. 2004)), overruled by Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, MEA/NEA v.
Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699 (Mich. 2010).
64. Michigan Citizens, 737 N.W.2d at 453. “The Lee/Cleveland Cliffs
majority [upon which the Michigan Citizens majority relied] explained that
Article III, § 1 of the federal constitution grants federal courts only the ‘judicial
power’ and Article III, § 2 limits the judicial power to certain ‘Cases’ or
‘Controversies.’ Although the Michigan Constitution does not include ‘Cases’ or
‘Controversies’ requirements, the Lee/Cleveland Cliffs majority concluded that
the Michigan Constitution is analogous to the federal constitution because it
expressly requires the separation of powers and grants courts only the judicial
power. The majority further determined that the cornerstone of the judicial
power is the case-or-controversy requirement.” Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n,, 792
N.W.2d at 692 (citations omitted).
65. Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 693–96, 699.
66. Id. at 697-98.
67. Id. at 698 (citing Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773 N.W.2d 564, 574 (Mich.
2009)).
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interests” because the requirements “may prevent litigants from
enforcing public rights, despite the presence of adverse interests
and parties, and regardless of whether the Legislature intended a
private right of enforcement to be part of the statute’s
enforcement scheme.”68
The court commented, as many
commentators had noted, that the Lujan standard “has the effect
of encouraging courts to decide the merits of a case under the
guise of merely deciding that the plaintiff lacks standing, thus
using ‘standing to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who
are entitled to full consideration of their claims on the merits.’ ”69
The temporary setback and subsequent redemption of
MEPA’s citizen suit provision described above has enormous
implications for environmental protections in Michigan and
reveals the dangers of not maintaining lenient standing
requirements
in
environmentally-concerned
jurisdictions
throughout the United States. The Lansing court’s view that
Michigan’s Constitution does not imply a “case or controversy”
requirement is both the prevalent view in Michigan and a view
readily applicable to the New York State Constitution. As in
Michigan, courts would have to read a “case or controversy”
requirement into the New York State Constitution in order to
undermine a citizen suit bill through constitutional challenge.70
But, as the Lansing court stated, judicial striking of a citizen suit
enacted by a legislature in fact represents a violation of
separation of powers rather than its preservation. In instances
where the legislature has voted to allow the judiciary to review

68. Id. The court’s repudiation of legislative intent’s superiority over public
interests is noteworthy because the Society of Plastics court deployed the
legislature’s rejection of a citizen suit provision in SEQRA as proof that more
lenient standing requirements were inappropriate. See Soc'y of Plastics Indus.,
Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1054 (N.Y. 1991). Moreover, as
discussed below, the Society of Plastics court misconstrued SEQRA’s legislative
history, and the legislature in fact never did expressly reject a citizen suit
provision as part of SEQRA.
69. Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 698 (quoting Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464,
490 (1982)).
70. Soc'y of Plastics, 573 N.E.2d at 1040. Even the Society of Plastics court
acknowledged that there is no “case or controversy” requirement in the New
York State Constitution.
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certain matters, it is simply exercising its power to make law.71
Prior to Lee v. Macomb Co. Board of Commissioners, the case
which established the precedent followed in Michigan Citizens,
“no Michigan case had held that the issue of standing posed a
constitutional issue. Nor did any case hold that Michigan’s
judicial branch was subject to the same case-or-controversy
limitation imposed on the federal judicial branch under article III
of the United States Constitution.”72 Similarly, no New York
State court has contemplated that standing poses a constitutional
issue.
In Michigan Citizens, the petitioners were a non-profit
corporation “formed to protect and conserve water resources of
Michigan, particularly in Mecosta County,” the site of the project
in question” as well as property owners along lakes and streams
in the County.73 By determining that the petitioners failed to
71. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 82628 (Mich. 2010) (Weaver, J., concurring in result), overruled by Lansing Sch.
Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d 686 (“While pretending to limit its ‘judicial power,’ the
majority’s application of Lee’s judicial standing test [contravening legislative
intent to provide a citizen suit] in this case actually expands the power of the
judiciary at the expense of the Legislature by undermining the Legislature’s
constitutional authority to enact laws . . . .”). Early in his concurrence, Weaver
expounded upon the dangers of judicial interference with statutory purposes:
I dissent from the majority's analysis of “standing” and “judicial
power” because this analysis utterly ignores the will of the people of
Michigan expressed in art. 4, § 52 of our Constitution that
[t]he conservation and development of the natural resources of
the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern
in the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the
people. The legislature shall provide for the protection of the air,
water and other natural resources of the state from pollution,
impairment and destruction . . . .
The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the
circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred
or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against any
person for the protection of the air, water, and other natural
resources and the public trust in these resources from pollution,
impairment, or destruction. [MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701(1) (2014)
(emphasis added).].
Id. at 826.
72. Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 703 (Weaver, J., concurring)
(quoting Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am.
Inc., 737 N.W.2d 447, 464 (Mich. 2007)).
73. Michigan Citizens, 737 N.W.2d at 450.
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prove a particularized injury as required under the adopted
federal standard, the court found that the petitioners did not
possess “recreational, aesthetic, or economic interest in” Osprey
Lake and adjacent wetlands.74 In contrast, Judge P.J. Murphy’s
concurrence in the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the
petitioners:
have standing because of the complex, reciprocal nature of the
ecosystem that encompasses the pertinent natural resources
noted above and because of the hydrologic interaction,
connection, or interrelationship between these natural resources,
the springs, the aquifer, and defendant Nestlé’s pumping
activities, whereby impact on one particular resource caused by
Nestlé’s pumping necessarily affects other resources in the
surrounding area. Therefore, although there was no evidence
that plaintiffs actually used or physically participated in
activities on the Osprey Lake impoundment and wetlands 112,
115, and 301, environmental injuries to those natural resources
play a role in any harm caused to the Dead Stream, the Dead
Stream’s wetlands, and Thompson Lake, which are used by and
adjacent to property owned by plaintiffs and not the subject of a
standing challenge.75

Therefore the petitioners asserted, and at least part of the
Michigan Court of Appeals recognized, fundamental principles of
deep ecology.76 Remarkably, the Supreme Court of Michigan
disagreed, even commenting that “pervasive . . . environmental
damage in an ecosystem” does not matter in the face of the
plaintiff’s inability to assert injury-in-fact according to federal
74. Id. at 463.
75. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters of N. Am.,
Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (Murphy, J., concurring), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007), overruled by Lansing Sch.
Educ. Ass'n MEA/NEA v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2010).
Judge Murphy's outlook closely resembles the broad and complex
interconnectedness of water sources contaminated by the localized construction
projects at issue in Finger Lakes and Long Island Pine Barrens. See infra Part
III.
76. See generally BILL DEVALL & GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY 7-8 (1985).
Deep ecology is the notion that the biosphere is largely defined by its
interconnectedness and one sector’s well-being is inextricably linked to others.
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standards.77 Although Lansing overruled Michigan Citizens, the
latter case indicates the dangers of using rigid standing
requirements to close the doors on environmental plaintiffs.
Based on the reasoning of Michigan Citizens, real environmental
degradation may be ignored and courts may subvert our most upto-date understanding of the interrelatedness of ecosystems and
notions of what constitutes a healthy environment.78 With
Lansing, Michigan attempted to support its environmental
protection act by guaranteeing citizen oversight.79
In Anglers of the AuSable, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Quality, the plaintiffs attempted to prevent a
power company from discharging contaminants from an
environmental cleanup site into a previously unpolluted site.80
The plaintiffs were seeking to “protect the AuSable River
watershed.”81 The court granted standing, reiterating that
Lansing supported the premise that “statutes granting standing”
should be read “as written.”82 AuSable demonstrates Michigan’s
current approach to standing and how the citizen suit provision
fulfills statutory purposes. Concerned citizens were able to
establish standing even if they lacked special harm.83 The
concurrence articulated the larger implications of MEPA’s citizen
standing provision, how the provision influences MEPA, and how
MEPA, in turn, has impacted environmental regulation:
Michigan’s EPA was the first legislation of its kind and has
attracted worldwide attention. The act also has served as a model
for other states in formulating environmental legislation. The
enactment of the EPA signals a dramatic change from the
practice where the important task of environmental law
77. Michigan Citizens, 737 N.W.2d at 457.
78. Id.
79. See Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d 686.
80. See Anglers of the AuSable, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 793 N.W.2d
596 (Mich. 2010), vacated, 796 N.W.2d 240 (Mich. 2011).
81. AuSable, 793 N.W.2d at 604.
82. Id. at 603 (“Accordingly, MEPA, which specifies that ‘any person may
maintain an action . . . against any person for the protection of the air, water,
and other natural resources and the public trust in these resources from
pollution, impairment, or destruction,’ should be applied as it is written.”
(citation omitted)).
83. Id. at 603-04.
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enforcement was left to administrative agencies without the
opportunity for participation by individuals or groups of citizens.
Not every public agency proved to be diligent and dedicated
defenders of the environment. The EPA has provided a sizable
share of the initiative for environmental law enforcement for that
segment of society most directly affected—the public. But the
EPA does more than give standing to the public and grant
equitable powers to the circuit courts, it also imposes a duty on
individuals and organizations both in the public and private
sectors to prevent or minimize degradation of the environment
which is caused or is likely to be caused by their activities.84

Under current standing requirements in New York State, the
plaintiffs in AuSable may have only been able to achieve standing
because they owned property along the course of the Ausable
River or, alternatively, because they demonstrated regular
recreational use of the river and thereby were able to allege
special harm.85 Otherwise, if New York State’s standing rules
had applied to the facts in AuSable, then state-permitted
unreasonable pollution of public resources would have been
allowed to continue unabated:
Defendants have presented no authority for the proposition that
the diversion of contaminated water from one source to an
uncontaminated watershed should be considered reasonable. It
would be incongruous to hold that it is reasonable to
decontaminate water by contaminating different water.
Furthermore, it would be unconscionable and destructive for this
Court to determine that it is reasonable to spread dangerous
contamination throughout Michigan as we have described. The
necessarily resulting harm would be spread not only to
immediate downstream users but, in the end, to anyone in
Michigan who relies, directly or indirectly, on our state’s water
remaining clean.86

84. Id. at 608 (quoting Ray v. Mason Cnty. Drain Comm’r, 224 N.W.2d 883,
887 (Mich. 1975)).
85. See generally AuSable, 793 N.W.2d at 603. Though plaintiffs did own
property along the AuSable River and indicated they fished in its waters, the
Michigan court noted that they would have had standing even if they did not
possess such property nor participated in recreation on the river. Id.
86. Id.at 604-05.
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In other words, the Ausable court would have found standing
existed simply because the plaintiffs were citizens of Michigan
seeking to protect the state’s natural resources regardless of the
plaintiffs’ particular and personal relationship to the river.87
Michigan represents the broadest of the major categories of
environmental standing, a group in which any person may bring
suit to protect resources regardless of injury to the plaintiff, let
alone special harm. South Dakota, Massachusetts, and Louisiana,
all possess citizen suit provisions similar to Michigan’s.88
Minnesota
Minnesota’s Environmental Rights Act (MERA) is closely
modeled on Michigan’s.89 MERA essentially removes strict
standing requirements, which were once present under
Minnesota’s common law.90 The Act actually advances standing
87. Id. at 603-04 (“[I]t is clear under MEPA ‘any person’ has standing to
maintain an action protecting Michigan’s natural resources . . . . Because
plaintiffs certainly qualify under the statute's designation of ‘any person,’
plaintiffs would have standing regardless of the Court's decision in Nestlé ”).
88. James R. May, The Availability of State Environmental Citizen Suits, 18
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, no. 4, 2004, at 53, 55, available at
http://works.bepress.com/james_may/28.
89. State ex rel. Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27,
30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). A neighboring state's adoption of Michigan's law and
policy is yet another indicator of MEPA's success in practice.
90. Timothy S. Murphy, Environmental Law – Protection of Scenic and
Aesthetic Resources under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act – State ex
rel. Drabik v. Martz, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1190, 1195-96 (1991) (“The
removal of these obstacles allows private citizens effectively to confront
environmental degradation.”). MERA’s citizen suit provision reads as follows:
Any person residing within the state; the attorney general; any
political subdivision of the state; any instrumentality or agency of
the state or of a political subdivision thereof; or any partnership,
corporation, association, organization, or other entity having
shareholders, members, partners or employees residing within the
state may maintain a civil action in the district court for declaratory
or equitable relief in the name of the state of Minnesota against any
person, for the protection of the air, water, land, or other natural
resources located within the state, whether publicly or privately
owned, from pollution, impairment, or destruction; provided,
however, that no action shall be allowable hereunder for acts taken
by a person on land leased or owned by said person pursuant to a
permit or license issued by the owner of the land to said person
which do not and cannot reasonably be expected to pollute, impair,
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beyond MEPA; MERA does not require a plaintiff to show that a
defendant’s conduct adversely affecting the environment was
“unreasonable.”91 Nevertheless, Minnesota courts recognize the
need for a standing filter in the context of MERA.92 Accordingly,
State by Schaller v. County of Blue Earth established
requirements for a plaintiff to show a prima facie cause of action
to fulfill MERA standing. At the outset, the court conceded that
“almost every human activity has some kind of adverse impact on
a natural resource” and concluded that it could not “construe
MERA as prohibiting virtually all human enterprise.”93 There
are two prongs that plaintiffs must fulfill as part of their prima
facie case: 1) the threatened resource must be a protected
resource according to MERA and 2) “conduct by the defendant
must cause or be likely to cause ‘pollution, impairment or
destruction’” as defined in MERA.94 The Schaller court followed
or destroy any other air, water, land, or other natural resources
located within the state; provided further that no action shall be
allowable under this section for conduct taken by a person pursuant
to any environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order,
license, stipulation agreement or permit issued by the Pollution
Control Agency, Department of Natural Resources, Department of
Health or Department of Agriculture.
MINN. STAT. § 116B.03 (2013). Furthermore, MERA contains an environmental
right invested in the citizens of the state:
The legislature finds and declares that each person is entitled by
right to the protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water,
land, and other natural resources located within the state and that
each person has the responsibility to contribute to the protection,
preservation, and enhancement thereof. The legislature further
declares its policy to create and maintain within the state conditions
under which human beings and nature can exist in productive
harmony in order that present and future generations may enjoy
clean air and water, productive land, and other natural resources
with which this state has been endowed. Accordingly, it is in the
public interest to provide an adequate civil remedy to protect air,
water, land and other natural resources located within the state
from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
Id. § 116B.01.
91. Murphy, supra note 90, at 1198. Alternatively, “reasonable conduct” is
recognized as an affirmative defense in Minnesota.
92. State by Schaller v. Cnty. of Blue Earth, 563 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn.
1997).
93. Id. at 265 (quoting Wacouta, 510 N.W.2d at 30).
94. Id. at 264.
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State ex. rel. Wacouta Township v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp. and
required that the plaintiff fulfill Michigan’s test95 to determine
whether conduct has or would “materially adversely affect” the
environment and thereby fulfill the second prong.96 Accordingly,
in Schaller, the court distilled the second prong into the following
five-part balancing test to determine whether a new two-lane
highway “materially adversely affected” the environment:
(1) The quality and severity of any adverse effects of the proposed
action on the natural resources affected;
(2) Whether the natural resources affected are rare, unique,
endangered, or have historical significance;
(3) Whether the proposed action will have long-term adverse
effects on natural resources, including whether the affected
resources are easily replaceable (for example, by replanting trees
or restocking fish);
(4) Whether the proposed action will have significant
consequential effects on other natural resources (for example,
whether wildlife will be lost if its habitat is impaired or
destroyed); [and]

95. Id. at 265-67; see also People for Envtl. Enlightenment & Responsibility
(PEER), Inc. v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858, 866 (Minn. 1978)
(indicating that the Supreme Court of Minnesota frequently utilizes Michigan
cases to analyze MERA).
96. Rather than require conduct be “unreasonably” damaging to the
environment to qualify for judicial review, MERA demands that conduct
“materially adversely affect” the environment, a comparatively relaxed
requirement. The relevant portion of MERA reads as follows:
“Pollution, impairment or destruction” is any conduct by any person
which violates, or is likely to violate, any environmental quality
standard, limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or
permit of the state or any instrumentality, agency, or political
subdivision thereof which was issued prior to the date the alleged
violation occurred or is likely to occur or any conduct which
materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect
the environment; provided that “pollution, impairment or
destruction” shall not include conduct which violates, or is likely to
violate, any such standard, limitation, rules, order, license,
stipulation agreement or permit solely because of the introduction of
an odor into the air.
MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (2013) (emphasis added).
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(5) Whether the affected natural resources are significantly
increasing or decreasing in number, considering the direct and
consequential impact of the proposed action.97

The factors are neither exclusive nor dispositive. Rather,
courts weigh them depending on the type of resource threatened
by a project.98
Minnesota’s (and Michigan’s) five-part prima facie impact
test proves that the presence of a citizen suit provision does not
eliminate judicial safeguards against frivolous, redundant, and
inefficient litigation. In fact, the Schaller court held that the
plaintiff challenging construction of the highway lacked standing
because the noise estimates he relied upon were inaccurate,
habitat destruction resulting from the highway’s construction did
not affect “rare, endangered, or threatened” resources or destroy
irreplaceable trees, and the affected area was small compared to
the area condemned for the project.99 Thus, in contrast to New
York’s plaintiff-centric requirements, the Schaller court espoused
a standing doctrine focused on injury to the environment rather
than the plaintiffs. In doing so, Minnesota courts remain
unhampered by frivolous suits.100 Therefore Minnesota provides
another worthy example of where a citizen suit empowers the
public to protect its environment more so than New York and yet
is reined in by a nuanced and balanced standing test. Again,
Minnesota’s lack of New York’s special harm requirement enables
the public to defend its public right101 regardless of private stakes
in the matter. Like Michigan, Minnesota falls into the most

97. Schaller, 563 N.W.2d at 267.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 265.
100. See Zander v. State, 703 N.W.2d 845, 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (plaintiffs
challenged approval of a highway expansion from two to four lanes but failed
the Schaller test when alleging that the project would destroy “state-listed
valerian plants” and destroy wetlands); State ex rel. Fort Snelling State Park
Ass'n v. Minneapolis Park & Recreation Bd., 673 N.W.2d 169, 178 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2003) (finding that proposed athletic center constituted no “materially
adverse effect” on a protected resource); In re Univ. of Minn., 566 N.W.2d 98,
104 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that realtors failed to fulfill the Schaller
factors when alleging that steam plants would cause a “materially adverse
effect” on a protected resource).
101. See MINN. STAT. § 116B.01 (2013).
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generous category of environmental standing, where any person
may file suit to protect the environment regardless of injury to
the petitioner and, of course, regardless of special harm.102
Connecticut
Connecticut followed Michigan’s lead and passed a citizen
standing statute in 1971.103 Coupled with a powerful declaration
of the public trust doctrine,104 Connecticut possesses a formidable
statutory framework for protecting public environmental
interests.105 Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Edward J.
102. May, supra note 88, at 53.
103. W. Scott Magargee, Protecting the Environment: Creating a Citizen
Standing-to-Sue Statute in Virginia, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 235, 246 (1991). The
Connecticut statute reads:
The Attorney General, any political subdivision of the state, any
instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision
thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association,
organization or other legal entity may maintain an action in the
superior court for the judicial district wherein the defendant is
located, resides or conducts business, except that where the state is
the defendant, such action shall be brought in the judicial district of
Hartford, for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any
political subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the
state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership,
corporation, association, organization or other legal entity, acting
alone, or in combination with others, for the protection of the public
trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from
unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction provided no such
action shall be maintained against the state for pollution of real
property acquired by the state under subsection (e) of section 22a133m where the spill or discharge which caused the pollution
occurred prior to the acquisition of the property by the state.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-16 (2013).
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-15 (“It is hereby found and declared that there is
a public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state of
Connecticut and that each person is entitled to the protection, preservation and
enhancement of the same. It is further found and declared that it is in the public
interest to provide all persons with an adequate remedy to protect the air, water
and other natural resources from unreasonable pollution, impairment or
destruction.”).
105. Jennifer E. Sills, Environmental Protection Act (“CEPA”): Enabling
Citizens to Speak for the Environment, 70 CONN. B. J. 353, 359-60 (1996) (“Once
a plaintiff has filed a verified pleading in accordance with § 22a-19(a),
intervention is a matter of right, which the court has no discretion to deny. A
plaintiff need not prove any pollution, impairment, destruction of the
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Stockton, though thirty-years old, is still cited as binding
authority on the question of standing. The lenient requirements
set forth by the court, since undisturbed by intervening judicial or
legislative action, suggest frivolous suits as well as self-interested
and solely economic interests have not sufficiently troubled
Connecticut’s electorate or judiciary to cause them to disturb
Manchester Environmental Coalition’s holding.
Manchester Environmental Coalition involved plaintiffs who
challenged the construction of an industrial park which was
approved without an environmental impact statement (EIS), and
which the plaintiffs alleged would cause pollution of the air due to
increased auto emissions generated by the park’s employees.106
The Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed with the trial court
that the plaintiffs had standing because the Connecticut
Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) “confers standing upon
‘any person’ to sue ‘any person’ for ‘the protection of the public
trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state
from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction.’”107 On
the one hand, the court’s decision expresses the emphasis of
actual environmental impact when determining justiciability and,
on the other hand, discusses the restraints that guarantee that
relaxed standing requirements do not overburden the courts.108
In contrast to New York’s decisions under Article 78 proceedings,
the Manchester Environmental Coalition court did not even
discuss the identities of the plaintiffs, instead focusing on the
broad wording of CEPA which granted the plaintiffs standing.109
Rather than having to plead particularized harm, the plaintiffs
environment in order to have standing, and will have standing even if the
allegations prove unfounded.” (citation omitted)).
106. See Manchester Envtl. Coal. v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1981),
overruled by City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102 (Conn.
2002).
107. Id. at 73.
108. See id. at 73-76.
109. Id. at 73 (“This act expands the class of plaintiffs who are empowered to
institute proceedings to vindicate public interest. . . . Similar acts . . . . are best
known for eliminating standing barriers prevalent in traditional litigation. . . .
[T]he plaintiffs have standing under s 22-16 which confers standing upon ‘any
person’ to sue ‘any person’ for ‘the protection of the public trust in the air, water,
and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution,
impairment or destruction.’” (citations omitted)).
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needed to show how the defendant’s conduct “acting alone, or in
combination with others, has, or reasonably likely unreasonably
to pollute, impair, or destroy the public trust in air, water, or
Nevertheless, the
other natural resources of the state”110
plaintiffs did not have unbridled access to courts. “The legislative
history shows that the word ‘unreasonably’ was added [to the
statute] as a means of preventing lawsuits directed solely for
harassment purposes.”111 Regarding the particular facts of
Manchester Environmental Coalition, the trial court found, and
the appellate court upheld, that the plaintiffs successfully alleged
prima facie pollution to a resource of the state resulting from the
defendant’s conduct: increased auto emissions into the state’s air
due to increased traffic related to the new industrial park.112 The
standing requirements matched the intent of the statute: the
plaintiff had to show prima facie damage to a state
environmental resource.113 Unlike New York, Connecticut’s
standing requirements under its environmental protection act
closely align with the act’s intent and thus serve to aid in
110. Id. at 74 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-17).
111. Id. Attorney for the majority leadership of the state’s House of
Representatives said of the “reasonableness” requirement:
‘Now in framing this legislation, it was our judgment that all of us
pollute the environment to one degree or another, simply by
breathing, obviously we introduce elements into the environment
which are not natural. And therefore, if we are going to permit the
use of the courts by citizens to bring lawsuits against those who do
pollute the environment, we believe there must be a check to prevent
those suits which are brought simply for harassment, and for no
other purpose. Therefore, H.B. 5037, which Speaker Ratchford has
introduced, permits law suits against those who unreasonably
pollute the environment . . . if S.B. 400 were passed with no check,
then you might wind up with spite suits between neighbors and that
sort of thing over conditions that are nothing more than spite
between neighbors. We feel our bill, which imposes the reasonable
standard, would be such as to eliminate that possibility.’
Manchester Envtl. Coal. v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68, 74 n.10 (Conn. 1981) (citation
omitted).
112. Manchester, 441 A.2d at 74.
113. See City of Waterbury, 800 A.2d at 1132-36 (refining Manchester
Environmental Coalition by clarifying that Manchester Environmental
Coalition's holding did not mean that unreasonable pollution occurs merely
when environmental impairment exceeds de minimis damage. Rather,
reasonability should be assessed by CEPA's statutory provisions governing the
defendant’s conduct.).
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protecting natural resources. Since a plaintiff need not establish
any actual harm to the environment and thus no injury-in-fact,
Connecticut is situated with Michigan and Minnesota at the most
liberal level of standing requirements for environmental suits.
New Jersey
Like Connecticut, New Jersey also possesses a citizen suit
statute permitting public enforcement of state environmental
laws.114 Courts have read the citizen suit provision to apply
broadly and literally. In Port of Monmouth Development Corp. v.
Middletown Township., the court said of the citizen suit
provision: “it is now well established that where intent is made
clear in its language, courts will enforce a statute according to its
terms.”115 The plaintiff in Port of Monmouth was a successor in
title to land once used as a landfill and sought to compel the
former municipal operator of the landfill to comply with its
closure obligations under New Jersey’s Solid Waste Management
114. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:35a-4 (2013).
a. Any person may commence a civil action in a court of competent
jurisdiction against any other person alleged to be in violation of any
statute, regulation or ordinance which is designed to prevent or
minimize pollution, impairment or destruction of the environment.
The action may be for injunctive or other equitable relief to compel
compliance with a statute, regulation or ordinance, or to assess civil
penalties for the violation as provided by law. The action may be
commenced upon an allegation that a person is in violation, either
continuously or intermittently, of a statute, regulation or ordinance,
and that there is a likelihood that the violation will recur in the
future.
b. Except in those instances where the conduct complained of
constitutes a violation of a statute, regulation or ordinance which
establishes a more specific standard for the control of pollution,
impairment or destruction of the environment, any person may
commence a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for
declaratory and equitable relief against any other person for the
protection of the environment, or the interest of the public therein,
from pollution, impairment or destruction.
c. The court may, on the motion of any party, or on its own motion,
dismiss any action brought pursuant to this act which on its face
appears to be patently frivolous, harassing or wholly lacking in
merit.
115. Port of Monmouth Dev. Corp. v. Middletown Twp., 551 A.2d 1030, 1033
(N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1988).
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Act (SWMA).116 In line with literal statutory interpretation, the
court determined that “the Environmental Rights Act permits
any person to seek enforcement of SWMA.”117 It is worth noting
that the landfill was “nonhazardous,”118 and that the plaintiff’s
injury was not discussed at all in that portion of the opinion
addressing standing. The defendant municipality had failed to
comply with SWMA because it neglected to cover the closed
landfill with “a minimum of two feet of compacted cover of soil,
earth or other insoluble and non-degradable material covered by
the DEP [New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection].”119 According to the opinion in Howell Township v.
Waste Disposal Inc., New Jersey’s Environmental Rights Act
(ERA), which contains the citizen standing provision, “constitutes
umbrella legislation in an area of great current public concern
[and] was passed primarily to insure access to the courts by all
persons interested in abating or preventing environmental
damage.”120
Provision (c)121 acts to curtail the kind of lawsuits that may
be brought under the ERA. Though “essentially [the ERA]
empowers any person to maintain an action to enforce or restrain
violation of any statute, regulation or ordinance establishing
protection against impairment or destruction of the
environment,” the act also deploys res judicata and collateral
estoppel to prevent multiplicity of suits.122 It also grants courts a
“supervisory role in dismissing ‘patently frivolous, harassing’
litigation.”123 Limits on ERA standing were demonstrated in
Hoboken Environment Committee, Inc. v. German Seaman’s
Mission of New York, in which the court found a citizens group
lacked standing to enjoin demolition of a historic building.124
116. Id. at 1031.
117. Id. at 1032.
118. Id. at 1030.
119. Id. at 1032.
120. Howell Twp. v. Waste Disposal Inc., 504 A.2d 19, 25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986).
121. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:35a-4.
122. Howell, 504 A.2d at 25-26.
123. Id. at 26.
124. See Hoboken Env’t Comm., Inc. v. German Seaman’s Mission of N.Y., 391
A.2d 577, 580 (N.J.C. 1978) (“Although this statute grants liberal standing
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The citizen standing suit has not usurped agency discretion.
In In re New Jersey Pinelands Commission Resolution, an
appellate court upheld the trial court’s holding that
environmental organizations lacked standing to challenge a
settlement agreement allowing development of land possessing
The court found the
endangered timber rattlesnakes.125
Pinelands Commission had already “fulfilled [the] role” of
prosecuting a violation of the Endangered and Nongame Species
Conservation Act (ENSCA) because the Commission had made
“specific provisions in the settlement agreement for immediate
protection of the timber rattlesnake and its habitat in
conformance with [the Pinelands Protection Act].”126 Therefore
the plaintiffs’ role as enforcers of public resource protection had
already been occupied by an administrative agency.
Furthermore, subsection (b)127 of the citizen suit statute
offers a further constraint on plaintiffs. In Springfield v. Lewis, a
federal court applying New Jersey law found that the plaintiffs
failed to establish standing under the ERA because there existed
“a more specific standard for the control of pollution, impairment,
or destruction of the environment.”128 Peter H. Lehner has
argued that subdivision (b) of the citizen suit provision is an
immensely significant check on plaintiff opportunity since, he
claims, “nearly any governmental license, plan or seal of approval
count[s] as a ‘specific standard for control of pollution.’ “129
Therefore, the ERA’s citizen suit provision, which Lehner says
because “every person has a substantial interest in minimizing this condition” of
polluting and impairing the environment, N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-2, it is clearly limited
to destruction or harm to the natural environment as opposed to the destruction
of historical buildings. Plaintiffs' reliance upon this statute is obviously
misplaced.”) However the plaintiffs were able to establish standing under other
statutes. Id. at 581-83.
125. See In re N.J. Pinelands Comm. Resolution, 812 A.2d 1113 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2003).
126. Id. at 1119.
127. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:35a-4(b).
128. See Twp. of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426, 452 (3d Cir. 1983). The
“more specific standard” was set forth by an Action Plan, prepared by the
Federal Highway Administration, elaborating on the procedures required to
develop highway projects and the environmental effects. Id. at 443.
129. Peter H. Lehner, The Efficiency of Citizen Suits, 2 ALB. L. ENVTL.
OUTLOOK 4, 11 n.71 (1995).
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facially “appears to be the broadest citizen suit statute,” 130
possesses ample counterbalances to the broad public
empowerment it entails. Yet despite the restraints, New Jersey’s
citizen suit provision favorably compares to Michigan, Minnesota,
and Connecticut’s in that it allows any person to file suit
regardless of injury.
Illinois
Illinois has provided its public with the capability to protect
the environment by including a citizen suit provision in the state
constitution. Article 11, Section 2 provides not only a right to a
“healthful environment,” but also a mandate for “each person [to]
enforce this right.”131 Judicial opinions have differed on the
meaning of “healthful environment,” and therefore the question
as to whether a plaintiff’s concerns fall within the zone of
interests protected by Article 11 often turns on the elasticity of
the term. The Supreme Court of Illinois in Glisson v. City of
Marion determined that “healthful environment” did not
encompass protection of species listed in the Illinois Endangered
Species Act; rather, “healthful environment” referred to
conditions strictly favoring human health.132 Nevertheless, the
legislative history relied upon by the majority in Glisson
explicitly disavowed a “special injury” requirement thus directly
rejecting SEQRA’s court-constructed standing requirements.133
Furthermore, Illinois courts seem to harbor a generous notion of
standing as it pertains to Article 11; thus, even where
environmentally-minded plaintiffs have lost in court, such losses
130. Id. at 10.
131. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
132. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1044-45 (Ill. 1999); but see id.
at 1045 (Harrison, J., dissenting) (arguing that biodiversity is essential to
human welfare and that the majority inappropriately relied on legislative
history).
133. Id. at 1043 (“Because the wrong here has reached crisis proportions and
because it affects individuals in so fundamental a way, the Committee is of the
view that the ‘special injury’ requirement for standing is particularly
inappropriate and ought to be waived. Section [2], therefore, allows the
individual the opportunity to prove a violation of his right even though that
violation may be a public wrong, or one common to the public generally.”
(quotation omitted)).
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have been based on the merits and survived standing tests.134
Courts have even gone so far as to announce that the primary
intention in enacting Article 11, Section 2 was to remove a
“special injury” requirement from the common law requirements
of environmental nuisance claims.135
As discussed in People v. Pollution Control Board, legislative
action may modify the reach of standing under Article 11, Section
2, and Article 11 does not add “substantive causes of action” that
are not present in other statutes or common law.136 Therefore,
though Article 11 creates “standing for [the] individual to
[pursue] the public interest,” it does not provide “new substantive
rights.”137 When compared to Minnesota and Michigan, the
Illinois version of the citizen suit thus simultaneously contracts
and expands the individual’s ability to protect the public interest.
While on one hand its citizen suit carries the weight of a
constitutional right, the citizen suit provision of Illinois’
constitution does not appreciably expand environmental
protection causes of action whereas Minnesota and Michigan’s
citizen suit provisions do provide substantive causes of action.
Most importantly, however, all three states share a rejection of a
special harm standing requirement where plaintiffs are seeking
to enforce environmental protection acts. Illinois, though seeming
to require injury-in-fact unlike Michigan and Minnesota, has
nevertheless explicitly rejected New York’s special harm
requirement.
Hawai’i
Like Illinois, Hawai’i possesses a constitutional citizen
standing provision to protect an environmental right.138
134. See Ill. Pure Water Comm., Inc. v. Dir. of Pub. Health, 470 N.E.2d 988,
992 (Ill. 1984).
135. See City of Elgin v. Cnty. of Cook, 660 N.E.2d 875, 891 (Ill. 1995); see also
People v. Pollution Control Bd., 473 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
136. Pollution Control Bd., 473 N.E.2d at 456.
137. Id. at 455.
138. The Hawai’i constitution provides:
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as
defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including control
of pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of

33

1_Butzel&Thimmayya

34

Final REVISED

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

8/24/2015 12:03 PM

[Vol. 32

Paralleling the constitutional mandate, Hawai’i’s courts have
relied on the notion that public interest requires lenient
standing.139 Hawai’i’s environmental standing doctrine is most
clearly distinguishable from New York in that the plaintiff need
not assert a special harm.140 The state judiciary has eased
standing where environmental well-being is at stake as described
in Sierra Club v. Hawai’i Tourism Authority ex. rel. Board of
Directors:
in cases involving environmental concerns and native Hawai’ian
rights, this court’s opinions have moved “from ‘legal right’ to
‘injury in fact’ as the . . . standard . . . for judging whether a
plaintiff’s stake in a dispute is sufficient to invoke judicial
intervention[,]” from “economic harm . . . [to inclusion of]
‘[a]esthetic and environmental well-being’” as interests deserving
of protection and to the recognition that “a member of the public
has standing to . . . enforce the rights of the public even though
his [or her] injury is not different in kind from the public’s
generally, if he [or she] can show that he [or she] has suffered an
injury in fact[.]”141

In other words, in order to establish standing in an
environmental action, a plaintiff must: 1) have “suffered an
actual or threatened injury” that 2) must be “fairly traceable to
the defendant’s actions,” and 3) “a favorable decision [would]
likely provide relief for plaintiff’s injury;”142 but he or she need
not show an injury different from that of the general public. The
dissent in Sierra Club cited the environmental right present in
Hawai’i’s constitution to justify “less stringent” standing
natural resources. Any person may enforce this right against any
party, public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings,
subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.
HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9. See also Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292,
312 (Haw. 2007).
139. See Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247, 1257 (Haw. 1992) (“We hold
that [the plaintiff] has standing to bring its claims in [public] courts, consistent
with this court’s decisions lowering standing barriers in cases of public
interest.”).
140. See Sierra Club v. Haw. Tourism Auth. ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., 59 P.3d 877,
885 (Haw. 2002).
141. Id. at 886 (internal citations omitted).
142. Id.
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requirements.143 In addition, the dissent noted that while
Hawai’i had elected to follow the general federal doctrine of
separation of powers, the “cases or controversies” limitation was
not essential to maintaining such separation of powers.144
Michigan courts reached the exact same conclusion when
contemplating whether its own separation of powers restraint
implied a “cases and controversies” limitation, which would have
undermined MEPA’s citizen suit provision.145
Hawai’i’s liberal standing requirements have not resulted in
a toothless standing doctrine. For example, the plaintiffs in Mottl
v. Miyahira attempted to link the defendant’s withholding of $6
million from the University of Hawai’i’s appropriation to the
degradation of the university’s “work environment.”146 The court
determined that the allegation was not “specific” enough and
called for “assumptions or inferences that [were] not supported by
the record or any case law that the plaintiffs cite.”147
Furthermore, “[t]he loss of six million dollars could have been
offset by the university through a tuition increase, a reduction in
student services, a freeze of administrative—as opposed to
teaching—staff salaries, or other savings without any discernible
effect on the faculty members.”148 In short, the plaintiffs “failed
to assert an injury to a recognized interest” despite their
numerous analogies between the reduced quality of the “work
environment” at the university and cases in which standing
existed where “deterioration of air quality” and “odor nuisance”
prompted courts to determine that injury to “aesthetic,
recreational, or conservational interests” had occurred.149
Hawai’i’s courts have thus been successful in barring suits, even
with a constitutional environmental citizen suit provision, when
environmental well-being was not a genuine issue. Hawai’i is
similar to Illinois in that it has a constitutional environmental
citizen suit provision, but injury-in-fact remains a hurdle that
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 911 (Moon, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 908 n.8 (Moon, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 886.
See supra pp. 14-22.
Mottl v. Miyahira, 23 P.3d 716, 729 (Haw. 2001).
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id. at 729-30.
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must be overcome by petitioners. Even though not as lenient as
Michigan and Minnesota, Hawai’i espouses what should now be a
familiar theme to the reader: a rejection of New York’s special
harm requirement.150
Florida
Florida’s Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (FEPA)151
provides that citizens may “maintain an action for injunctive
150. Pennsylvania, though possessing a “self-executing,” Payne v. Kassab, 312
A.2d 86, 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 1973), environmental right, has substantially
narrowed that right and thus presents a less significant improvement over New
York’s standing requirements than Illinois and Hawai’i. PA. CONS. art I, §27
(“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”).
151. FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (2014).
(1) This section shall be known and may be cited as the
“Environmental Protection Act of 1971.”
(2) (a) The Department of Legal Affairs, any political subdivision or
municipality of the state, or a citizen of the state may maintain an
action for injunctive relief against:
1. Any governmental agency or authority charged by law
with the duty of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations for the
protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of
the state to compel such governmental authority to enforce
such laws, rules, and regulations;
2. Any person, natural or corporate, or governmental agency
or authority to enjoin such persons, agencies, or authorities
from violating any laws, rules, or regulations for the
protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of
the state.
(b) In any suit under paragraph (a), the Department of Legal
Affairs may intervene to represent the interests of the state.
(c) As a condition precedent to the institution of an action
pursuant to paragraph (a), the complaining party shall first file
with the governmental agencies or authorities charged by law
with the duty of regulating or prohibiting the act or conduct
complained of a verified complaint setting forth the facts upon
which the complaint is based and the manner in which the
complaining party is affected. Upon receipt of a complaint, the
governmental agency or authority shall forthwith transmit, by
registered or certified mail, a copy of such complaint to those
parties charged with violating the laws, rules, and regulations
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for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources
of the state. The agency receiving such complaint shall have 30
days after the receipt thereof within which to take appropriate
action. If such action is not taken within the time prescribed, the
complaining party may institute the judicial proceedings
authorized in paragraph (a). However, failure to comply with this
subsection shall not bar an action for a temporary restraining
order to prevent immediate and irreparable harm from the
conduct or activity complained of.
(d) In any action instituted pursuant to paragraph (a), the court,
in the interest of justice, may add as party defendant any
governmental agency or authority charged with the duty of
enforcing the applicable laws, rules, and regulations for the
protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of the
state.
(e) No action pursuant to this section may be maintained if the
person (natural or corporate) or governmental agency or
authority charged with pollution, impairment, or destruction of
the air, water, or other natural resources of the state is acting or
conducting operations pursuant to currently valid permit or
certificate covering such operations, issued by the appropriate
governmental authorities or agencies, and is complying with the
requirements of said permits or certificates.
(f) In any action instituted pursuant to this section, other than
an action involving a state NPDES permit authorized under s.
403.0885, the prevailing party or parties shall be entitled to costs
and attorney's fees. Any award of attorney's fees in an action
involving such a state NPDES permit shall be discretionary with
the court. If the court has reasonable ground to doubt the
solvency of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's ability to pay any cost or
judgment which might be rendered against him or her in an
action brought under this section, the court may order the
plaintiff to post a good and sufficient surety bond or cash.
(3) The court may grant injunctive relief and impose conditions on
the defendant which are consistent with and in accordance with law
and any rules or regulations adopted by any state or local
governmental agency which is charged to protect the air, water, and
other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or
destruction.
(4) The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel shall apply.
The court shall make such orders as necessary to avoid multiplicity
of actions.
(5) In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized
by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources
of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction, the
Department of Legal Affairs, a political subdivision or municipality
of the state, or a citizen of the state shall have standing to intervene
as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the
activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will
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relief” against governmental entities for failing to enforce, and
against nongovernmental entities for violations of, “laws, rules,
and regulations for the protection of the air, water, and other
natural resources of the state.”152 In an explicit rejection of New
York State’s standing doctrine, Florida Wildlife Federation v.
State Department of Environmental Regulation states:
If the legislature had meant for the special injury rule to be
preserved in the area of environmental protection, it could easily
have said so. We presume legislative awareness of the law of
have the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air,
water, or other natural resources of the state. As used in this section
and as it relates to citizens, the term “intervene” means to join an
ongoing s. 120.569 or s. 120.57 proceeding; this section does not
authorize a citizen to institute, initiate, petition for, or request a
proceeding under s. 120.569 or s. 120.57. Nothing herein limits or
prohibits a citizen whose substantial interests will be determined or
affected by a proposed agency action from initiating a formal
administrative proceeding under s. 120.569 or s. 120.57. A citizen's
substantial interests will be considered to be determined or affected
if the party demonstrates it may suffer an injury in fact which is of
sufficient immediacy and is of the type and nature intended to be
protected by this chapter. No demonstration of special injury
different in kind from the general public at large is required. A
sufficient demonstration of a substantial interest may be made by a
petitioner who establishes that the proposed activity, conduct, or
product to be licensed or permitted affects the petitioner's use or
enjoyment of air, water, or natural resources protected by this
chapter.
(6) Any Florida corporation not for profit which has at least 25
current members residing within the county where the activity is
proposed, and which was formed for the purpose of the protection of
the environment, fish and wildlife resources, and protection of air
and water quality, may initiate a hearing pursuant to s. 120.569 or s.
120.57, provided that the Florida corporation not for profit was
formed at least 1 year prior to the date of the filing of the application
for a permit, license, or authorization that is the subject of the notice
of proposed agency action.
(7) In a matter pertaining to a federally delegated or approved
program, a citizen of the state may initiate an administrative
proceeding under this subsection if the citizen meets the standing
requirements for judicial review of a case or controversy pursuant to
Article III of the United States Constitution.
(8) Venue of any causes brought under this law shall lie in the
county or counties wherein the cause of action is alleged to have
occurred. Id.
152. See id. § 403.412 (2)(a)(1).
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public nuisance with its special injury requirement. That the
legislature chose to allow citizens to bring an action where an
action already existed for those who had special injury persuades
us that the legislature did not intend that the special injury rule
carry over to suits brought under the EPA.
A reading of the entire EPA further bolsters this conclusion. The
act limits private plaintiffs to citizens, thereby countering some
of the multiple suit problems by precluding just any person from
coming into this state and instituting suit. Also, numerous
conditions precedent, as previously discussed, have been set out.
Provision has been made to protect those operations conducted
under governmental permits. In an obvious effort to limit
frivolous suits, the act provides that trial courts may require
plaintiffs to post bond. Finally, subsection (3) provides that the
trial courts may grant injunctive relief and impose conditions
consistent with law, rules, and regulations, thereby preserving
the court’s discretion as to whether or not the moving party has
stated a case sufficient to motivate granting the requested relief.
We hold, therefore, that section 403.412 creates a new cause of
action and that private citizens of Florida may institute suit
under that statute without a showing of special injury. As far as
what showing is necessary to state a cause of action under the
EPA, we note that a mere allegation of irreparable injury not
sustained by the allegation of facts will not ordinarily warrant
the granting of injunctive relief.153

The court elaborated upon “conditions precedent” to filing a
citizen suit:
An interested party must first file a complaint with the
appropriate agency. The complaint must set out the facts upon
which it is based and the manner in which the complainant is
affected. Thereafter, the agency has thirty days in which to act on
the complaint. Only after meeting these requirements and giving
the agency the opportunity to act may a complainant file suit in a
court of law.154

153. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation, 390 So. 2d 64, 67
(Fla. 1980) (citation omitted); see also Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 702 So. 2d 1352, 1354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (describing the
legislature’s view of environmental protection as implying “collective
responsibility” yet precluding non-citizens from utilizing the citizen suit).
154. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, 390 So. 2d at 66.
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Yet another case, Save Our Bay, Inc. v. Hillsborough County
Pollution Control Commission, represents an early rejection of
requisite special injury to bring suit and also reinforces the
“concept of liberality of pleading”:
It is exceedingly difficult for us to reasonably perceive, despite
the very persuasive oral argument of counsel for appellees to the
contrary, that appellant, comprising a group of lay citizens
interested in protecting and upgrading the environment, would
have any further knowledge of the action or nonaction of the
appellees in the premises other than that alleged in its
complaint. To require appellant to plead its case with more
particularity and specificity would be inconsistent with the well
accepted and understood concept of liberality in pleading.
On the authority of the statute and this court’s opinion in the
case of Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corporation,
the appellant does have Standing to sue and is not required to
show special injury beyond that sustained by the general
public.155

Thus, the court permitted a non-profit corporation to achieve
standing based on a generalized complaint that its members had
“regularly over the years” used Tampa Bay for “bathing,
swimming, fishing, boating, water sports, and generally as a
recreation and play area,” and the defendant utility company
polluted the bay by means of releasing effluent emissions into the
tributaries of the bay, which was impermissible under Florida
law and regulations.156
Evidently, however, injury-in-fact
against the public at large is required to establish standing; Save
Our Bay implied an injury-in-fact requirement by stating
“appellant does have standing to sue and is not required to show
special injury beyond that sustained by the general public.”157
Florida Wildlife Federation appended its rejection of special
injury with the reminder that “a mere allegation of irreparable
injury not sustained by the allegation of facts will not ordinarily
warrant the granting of injunctive relief.”158
155. Save Our Bay, Inc. v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pollution Control Comm’r, 285
So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (citation omitted).
156. Id. at 448.
157. Save Our Bay, 285 So. 2d at 449 (emphasis added).
158. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, 390 So. 2d at 67.
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In addition, the citizen suit statute provides insulation for
state permitting and licensing activities, and such protections
were judicially recognized in Greene v. State Department of
Natural Resources. In Greene, a petitioner sought injunctive relief
under FEPA section 403.412 (containing the citizen suit
provision) and an administrative hearing regarding State land
purchases as part of Florida’s Conservation and Recreation Land
Committee (CARL).159 The court distinguished between the
citizen suit in FEPA section 403.412, requiring no “special injury”
to bring an action in circuit court, and the petitioner’s attempts to
use the citizen suit as a “springboard” to initiate an
administrative proceeding.160
Despite the circuit
court/administrative proceeding
dichotomy, the state of Florida, via its legislature, saw fit to
include a citizen suit provision in its environmental protection act
when FEPA was passed four decades ago and has not since
perceived cause to retract this right from its citizens.161 Indeed,
the court in Florida Wildlife Federation associates the legislative
purpose stated in FEPA with the specific citizen suit provision
contained therein,162 and other states passing legislation
espousing a similar desire to protect natural resources, such as
New York, would do well to recognize the interplay between
legislative purpose and the citizen suit. Overall, Florida
represents a level of citizen standing more generous than New
York, but not as liberal as Connecticut, Minnesota, Michigan, and
New Jersey. Special injury is not required, but injury-in-fact
remains a hurdle that the plaintiff must clear.

159. Greene v. State Dep't of Nat. Res., 414 So. 2d 251, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
160. Id. at 253–54.
161. FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (2)(a)(1) (2014).
162. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, 390 So. 2d at 66. (“Over a decade ago, the electors of
Florida amended the state constitution to add section 7 to article II of that
document. That section states the public's intent that it 'be the policy of the
state to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty.' Section 7
further provides that '(a)dequate provision shall be made by law for the
abatement of air and water pollution.' To help effectuate that policy, the
legislature enacted the EPA as section 403.412 in 1971.”)
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California
California, though lacking an environmental citizen suit
provision, possesses more lenient standing requirements than
New York by virtue of an exception to its writ of mandamus
standing rules. To obtain a writ of mandamus for an injunction, a
party must establish a “beneficial interest” in obtaining such an
injunction.163 The “beneficial interest” has been defined as “
‘some special interest to be served or some particular right to be
reserved or protected over and above the public interest held in
common with the public at large.’ ”164 On its face, such a
requirement would seem to be in line with New York’s special
harm standing requirement. But there is a notable exception
which enhances environmental protection in California and
makes it more formidable than SEQRA’s public enforcement
mechanism.
The Supreme Court of California has stated that the “effects
of environmental abuse are not contained by political lines; strict
rules of standing that might be appropriate in other contexts
have no application where broad and long-term effects are
involved.”165 If a court determines such “broad and long-term
effects” to be so widespread that they infringe upon a public right,
then an “exception to the beneficial interest requirement”
exists.166 The public right/duty falls within the California
Environmental Quality Act’s (CEQA’s)167 subject matter. 168
163. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1086 (West 2013).
164. Prime Healthcare Mgmt., Inc. v. Valley Health Sys. (In re Valley Health
Sys.), 429 B.R. 692, 739 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Carsten v. Psychology
Examining Comm., 614 P.2d 276, 278 (Cal. 1980)).
165. Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 529 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Cal.
1975).
166. See In re Valley Health Sys., 429 B.R. at 739; Kappadahl v. Alcan Pac.
Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 354, 365 (Ct. App. 1963) (“However, where the enforcement of
the action is to procure enforcement of a public duty, this rule [beneficial
interest requirement] has been modified to permit property owners and others
to sue in mandamus since they have an interest as such in seeing that the public
duties are enforced.”); Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1023 (“Moreover, plaintiffs have
standing ‘to procure enforcement of a public duty . . . .’”).
167. Henry Michael Domzalski II, Bozung v. LAFCO: Municipal Boundary
Changes and the California Environmental Quality Act, 6 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 203, 209 (1975-1976). CEQA is California’s state equivalent of NEPA and
SEQRA. Like NEPA and SEQRA, “the most conspicuous of CEQA’s mandates is
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The limits of “broad and long-term” effects prove somewhat
elusive. An examination of facts where the exception has been
invoked by plaintiffs and upheld by the courts provides some
guidance. In Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n,
plaintiffs challenged a city’s annexation ordinance that occurred
without preparation of an EIS as required by CEQA.169 The court
pointed out that one of the plaintiffs had standing based on his
residency 1,800 feet from the affected property and such
proximity was sufficient to fit within the public duty exception.170
However, later in the opinion, the court remarks that all the
plaintiffs had standing to achieve enforcement of a public duty.171
Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co. shed further light on the
public duty exception, holding that “where the enforcement of the
action is to procure enforcement of a public duty, this rule has
been modified to permit property owners and others to sue in
mandamus, since they have an interest in such to see that public
duties are enforced.”172 The court further remarked that “where
the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result,
since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the
laws executed and the duty in question enforced.”173
The public duty in Kappadahl was the obligation of building
inspectors to not issue building permits in violation of zoning
ordinances. Even though the court admitted that the petitioners
that an EIR [Environmental Impact Report] be filed by all public agencies,
boards commissions, which propose to carry out or approve any project which
may have a significant effect on the environment.” Id. .
168. Matthews, supra note 11, at 450; see Citizens Ass’n for Sensible Dev. of
Bishop Area v. Cnty. of Inyo, 217 Cal. Rptr. 893, 897 (Ct. App. 1985) (“However,
where a public right is involved, and the object of the writ of mandate is to
procure enforcement of a public duty, the plaintiff is not required to have any
legal or special interest in the result . . . . Accordingly, in a writ of mandate
against a municipal entity based on alleged violations of CEQA, a property
owner, taxpayer, or elector who establishes a geographical nexus with the site of
the challenged project has standing.”).
169. Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1023.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Kappadahl v. Alcan Pac. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 354, 365 (Ct. App. 1963).
173. Id.
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had not alleged “damage to the petitioners [or] other persons
similarly situated,” it inferred an expected injury owing to a
devaluation of property due to increased traffic resulting from the
permitted construction.174 But the right does not seem limited to
property owners, as “taxpayers” are also individuals positioned to
invoke the public duty exception (presumably because taxpayers
have a fiduciary interest in seeing to it that government agencies
properly perform their functions).175 In Hollman v. Warren,
where the taxpaying petitioner alleged the governor needed to at
least consider applications for notary appointments, the court
applied the exception.176 Therefore, unlike suits under SEQRA,
California waives the special harm requirement for standing
where the public interest is concerned.
At the same time, a zone of interest requirement helps to
prevent frivolous and harassing suits. In Regency Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v. City of West Hollywood, the Court of Appeal
for the Second District determined that the plaintiff, an
advertising company, alleged “no environmental injury” as result
of a recent amendment to a city ordinance.177 The advertising
company, Regency, challenged the amendment because an earlier
amendment had compelled Regency to remove a tall wall sign
and, in the wake of the removal, competitors had occupied the
space.178 In light of the new amendment essentially restoring the
original standard under which Regency had legally occupied the
wall space, Regency alleged the city was playing “political
favorites,” resulting in the loss of three years income for the
agency.179 In court, Regency based its claim on the city’s failure
to review the environmental impact of restoring the old standard
as required by CEQA.180 The Court of Appeal, however, was not
persuaded that Regency had a “continuing interest or
commitment to the subject matter” of CEQA even though

174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Hollman v. Warren, 196 P.2d 562, 566 (Cal. 1948).
177. Regency Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of W. Hollywood, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d
287, 291 (Ct. App. 2007).
178. Id. at 289.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 290.
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Regency offered evidence of having initiating four prior CEQA
suits.181 The court characterized three of the four prior suits as
actions undertaken by Regency for the purposes of advancing its
“competitive and commercial interests.”182 Thus Regency failed
to fulfill the requirements for a corporation to achieve citizen
standing.
The Regency Outdoor Advertising court largely relied upon
Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. County of
Alameda, which set forth the limitations of standing under CEQA
and differentiated between a legitimate citizen suit and a purely
self-interested action.183 The Waste Management court asserted
that “CEQA is not a fair competition statutory scheme” and the
plaintiff’s “commercial and competitive interests [were] not
within the zone of interests CEQA was intended to preserve or
protect.”184 The court then provided a lengthy distillation of the
“citizen suit” exception to the “beneficial interest” standing
requirements.185 The opinion indicates that “citizen standing” in
public right claims represents “an exception to, rather than a
repudiation of, the usual requirement of beneficial interest.”186
Furthermore, “[t]he policy underlying the exception may be
outweighed by competing considerations of a more urgent
nature.”187
California courts possess a history of such findings. The
Waste Management court cited McDonald v. Stockton
181. Id. at 293
182. Id. (three of the four suits were filed against Regency's competitors for
billboard space).
183. Waste Mgmt. of Alameda Cnty., Inc. v. Cnty. of Alameda, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d
740 (Ct. App. 2000).
184. Id. at 748-49.
Numerous findings and declarations were made by the Legislature with
respect to CEQA. None of them suggest a purpose of fostering,
protecting, or otherwise affecting economic competition among
commercial enterprises. Thus, [the petitioner's] commercial and
competitive interests are not within the zone of interests CEQA was
intended to preserve or protect and cannot serve as a beneficial interest
for purposes of the standing requirement.
Id. (citations omitted).
185. Id. at 749-51.
186. Id. at 750.
187. Id.
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Metropolitan Transit as a situation where “the court rejected a
citizen’s suit because the action would have intruded upon the
remedial discretion of a public agency that was quite able to
protect its own interests.”188 The Waste Management court also
noted that in Carsten v. Psychology Examining Commission, a
member of an administrative board could not pursue a suit
against the board because “ ‘[h]er interest in the subject matter
was piqued by service on the board, not by virtue of the neutrality
of citizenship.’ ”189
As the above California cases demonstrate, though standing
to file citizen suits upholding CEQA is determined by California’s
common law, and although the “broad” reach of a citizen’s
interest is amorphous, courts’ standing decisions emphasize a
citizen’s right to enjoin the government to perform its public duty
rather than rely on the plaintiff’s allegation of special harm. It is
difficult to place California’s environmental standing
requirements in relation to the most generous frameworks
(Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Connecticut), and those states
which rely on injury-in-fact (Illinois, Florida, Hawai’i). Even
though the “beneficial interest” standard seems to be relaxed in
cases where a plaintiff invokes a public duty neglected by the
government, it is unclear whether this can extend to private
defendants. It is easy, however, to glean that California joins
188. Id. The federal Department of Transportation (DOT) was in a contractual
relationship with the local transit authority against which the DOT could seek
breach of contract remedies, including specific performance (installation of bus
stop shelters) or withholding of federal funds. See McDonald v. Stockton Metro.
Transit Dist., 111 Cal. Rptr. 637, 641-43 (Ct. App. 1973). Therefore a citizen's
suit would have infringed upon the DOT's discretion to seek performance under
the contract or withhold federal funds. See id. at 643. The bus stop shelters were
only afforded to the McDonald plaintiffs by virtue of the contract between DOT
and the local transit authority and “mandamus is not appropriate to enforce the
contractual obligations of a public body.” Id. at 642.
189. Waste Mgmt. of Alameda Cnty., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750 (quoting Carsten
v. Psychology Examining Comm’n, 614 P.2d 276, 280 (Cal. 1980)). Though Save
the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach repudiated Waste
Management’s distinction between corporate and individual standing
requirements, it did not disturb the court’s finding that Waste Management’s
motivations were based on business competition and the holding that such
motivations were improper grounds for a plaintiff to invoke the public right
exception. See Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d
1005, 1014 n.5 (Cal. 2011).
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most other jurisdictions in rejecting New York’s special harm
requirement.
V. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR JUDICIAL REFORM IN
NEW YORK STATE
Save the Pine Bush offers hope for environmental groups
seeking to protect natural resources that the groups can prove
individual members regularly utilize and enjoy.190 The case
suggests that the Court of Appeals harbors some willingness to
tinker with Society of Plastics’ standing apparatus. It was a
tentative though inadequate step towards reforming the
confusion and environmental harm that Society of Plastics has
wrought on the principles SEQRA is intended to uphold.
However, recently, in Clean Water Advocates of New York v. New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation, the
Society of Plastics test again produced an unreasonable result
and serves as a reminder that much remains to be done in the
wake of Save the Pine Bush before New York State citizens and
public interest organizations can fully benefit from SEQRA’s
original goals.191
Clean Water Advocates involved a challenge to stormwater
discharge of pollutants over a wide watershed.192 Though the
appellate division acknowledged that the plaintiff non-profit had
alleged runoff from construction of a Wal-Mart would impact
members who used nearby bodies of water for recreation and
potable water supply, the court nevertheless did not reach the
merits of the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs failed to
show that they used the water sources more frequently than
nonparties.193 The decision implies a perverse incentive for
190. See supra p. 3-4.
191. Clean Water Advocates of N.Y. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation,
962 N.Y.S.2d 390 (App. Div. 2013).
192. Id. at 391.
193. Id. at 393. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to allege that
Wal-Mart's stormwater pollution prevention plan would specifically lead to
pollution of Tonawanda Creek, the Erie Canal, Lake Ontario, and the Niagara
River. Id. at 392. Instead the court described the plaintiff's petition as alleging
that stormwater runoff from constructive activities in general tended to pollute
the named bodies of water. Id. However, the court's independent finding that
the plaintiffs failed to allege special harm would have barred the suit even if
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environmentally mindful plaintiffs: in order to be heard in court,
they may have to downplay the sweep of an environmental threat
and the number of people affected in order to demonstrate that
they suffer to a greater degree than the public-at-large. Such a
course would not only frustrate SEQRA’s purposes but also in fact
hinder its application by shrouding widespread environmental
degradation in carefully packaged and overly specific complaints,
which do not reflect the factual breadth of environmental
impacts. Thus Society of Plastics not only disqualifies legitimate
SEQRA claims but may also distort fact-finding related to the
merits of a claim.
The stormwater pollution not considered in Clean Water
Advocates, just like the noise and dust in Finger Lakes Coalition,
the contamination of the sole source aquifer in Long Island Pine
Barrens, the construction of the power plant in East End
Property, and the depletion of Saratoga Lake in Saratoga Lake
and Improvement District, all represent palpable environmental
threats which were not examined by courts simply because
Society of Plastics standards disqualified the plaintiffs.
It is worth noting that not only is the Society of Plastics test
contrary to the purposes and values of SEQRA, but the
precedential path the court followed to reach the decision is
highly suspect. Society of Plastics cited Matter of Mobile Oil v.
Syracuse Industrial Development Agency, which, in turn, relied on
Sun-Brite Car Wash, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals of Town
of North Hempstead.194 In Sun-Brite, the petitioner was a lessee
of a car wash objecting to a zoning board’s approval of the
construction of another car wash on a neighboring property.195
The board’s approval involved granting a variance for a nonClean Water Advocates had alleged that Wal-Mart's stormwater treatment plan
in particular would result in increased pollution of waterways. Id. at 392-93
(“Moreover, petitioner has not shown that any injuries that its members would
suffer due to the alleged impacts to the water bodies would be different from
that faced by the general public. Although petitioner alleges that its members
use the water bodies for recreational purposes and as their potable water source,
it does not allege, much less submit evidence, that any of its members do so any
more frequently than any other person with physical access to those same
resources.”).
194. Williams, supra note 1, at 173-174.
195. Sun-Brite Car Wash, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning & Appeals, 508 N.E.2d 130,
131 (N.Y. 1987).
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conforming use.196 For purposes of standing, the petitioner
suggested increased competition due to the new carwash qualified
it as an “aggrieved” petitioner. Sun-Brite was an “article 78
proceeding to annul the Board’s [of Zoning and Appeals]
determination.”197 The Court of Appeals in Sun-Brite makes no
mention of SEQRA, its purposes, content, or policy. Nevertheless,
in Mobile Oil, clearly a SEQRA case in which the petitioner
challenged the EIS regarding a proposed shopping mall,198 the
Court of Appeals relied upon Sun-Brite and in doing so adopted
the special harm requirement that is so undesirable in the
context of SEQRA.199 Thus Mobile Oil is where the trail leading
up to Society of Plastics took an inappropriate turn. As Joan
Leary Matthews200 has pointed out:
[I]t was wrong for the New York Court of Appeals to have
incorporated the zoning enforcement special harm requirement
into the SEQRA context. Enjoining a zoning violation is not in
the same posture as a preemptive challenge under SEQRA where
a petitioner alleges that an environmental review for an
impending project was inadequate. The restrictive standing
requirements on the zoning/land use model are inappropriate for
SEQRA claims, particularly given SEQRA’s broad mandate. The
presumption should be to grant standing, not to deny it. 201

Other critics of Society of Plastics suggest that Har
Enterprises v. Town of Brookhaven, a SEQRA case in which a
property owner appealed a town board decision to rezone property
from commercial to residential use,202 would, when compared to
Sun-Brite, have been a far more appropriate case for the Mobile

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Mobile Oil Corp. v. Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 559 N.E.2d 641, 642
(N.Y. 1990).
199. Id. at 643-44.
200. Joan Leary Matthews is the Director of the Clean Water Division of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region 2. See Organization
Chart
for
EPA's
Region
2
Office,
EPA,
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/organization-chart-epas-region-2-office#clean
(last updated July 4, 2014).
201. Matthews, supra note 11, at 444.
202. Har Enters. v. Town of Brookhaven, 548 N.E.2d 1289, 1291 (N.Y. 1989).
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Oil court to invoke.203 In Har, the petitioner specifically alleged
that the town board failed to comply with SEQRA by issuing an
inadequate declaration that the rezoning would not result in
“significant adverse environmental impact.”204 The court held
that “[a] showing of special damage or actual injury is not always
necessary to establish a party’s standing.”205 Har broadened
standing requirements to encompass plaintiffs who have “a
significant interest in having the mandates of SEQRA enforced,”
and, despite the court citing the plaintiff’s ownership status over
the parcels which the town board was attempting to rezone, Har
did not “delimit the parameters of the zone of interest in SEQRA
compliance or define the precise nexus with the proposed action
that a party must demonstrate in order to object for failure of
compliance.”206 Therefore, through adopting Mobile Oil’s view,
which incorrectly relied on Sun-Brite and neglected Har, the
precedential aspect of Society of Plastics stands on shaky
ground.207
Aside from utilizing suspect precedent, the Society of Plastics
court misstated the legislative history of SEQRA. Critics and
supporters of Society of Plastics have described how the Society of
Plastics court pointed to a supposed rejection of a citizen suit
provision in 1975, the year SEQRA was passed, as proof that the

203. Williams, supra note 1, at 174.
204. Har Enters., 548 N.E.2d at 1291.
205. Id. at 1292.
206. Id. at 1292-93. “To adopt the rule urged by respondent and deny
standing—absent an allegation that the owner will suffer some adverse
environmental consequence—would insulate decisions such as this from judicial
review, a result clearly contrary to the public interest.” Id. at 1293. “In some
instances, the party’s particular relationship to the subject of the action may
give rise to a presumption of standing.” Id. at 1292. Note that the court chose
the more generalized term “party” rather than a term denoting property rights
(e.g. land owner).
207. Philip Weinberg also points out that the plaintiffs in Society of Plastics
and Mobile Oil were “industry plaintiffs” and in Society of Plastics the plaintiff
was actually seeking to “derail environmentally beneficial legislation.” Philip
Weinberg, Are Standing Requirements Becoming the Great Barrier Reef Against
Environmental Actions?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 19-20 (1999) (“There is much
irony and scant justification for the courts now using these decisions to block
suits by those asserting genuine environmental concerns.”).
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legislature intended to limit citizen standing under SEQRA.208
However, there was no such provision in SEQRA. There were two
citizen suit bills considered by the state legislature in 1975, but
these bills were independent of SEQRA and pertained to claims
beyond SEQRA’s zone of interests.209 The Society of Plastics
court conflated the unrelated bills with SEQRA and thus
inaccurately characterized the legislative intent behind
SEQRA.210
Indeed, citizen standing in non-SEQRA government
compliance cases illustrate that the Society of Plastics test lags
behind established citizen-initiated review standards of
government conduct.211 Courts other than the Har court have
208. See Matthews, supra note 11, at 441-42; see also Daniel A. Coffey, A
Critique of New York’s Proposed Private Environmental Law Enforcement Act, 2
ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 23, 26 (1995) (conflating the citizen standing bills with
SEQRA partly due to the Society of Plastics opinion).
209. Matthews, supra note 11, at 441-42.
210. The Society of Plastics court misstated the legislative history as follows:
A “citizen suits” bill, once included in the proposed legislation, did
not appear in the final version. This bill, which several times failed
to gain legislative approval, would have added an article 10 to the
Environmental Conservation Law granting “standing to any person .
. . to institute an action for conservation and protection of the air,
water and other environmental resources of the state,” whether that
person was aggrieved or not.
Originally providing virtually unlimited access to the courts for
concerned citizens, several “safeguards” were later added to the
“citizen suits” bill—including a requirement that the party bringing
the action post a $500 bond and submit an affidavit of a “technically
qualified person” indicating the grounds for the suit. Those
amendments were a response to concerns that the bill would open
the floodgates to litigation. Sponsors of the measure attempted to
portray it as one that would allow concerned citizens, with no
prospect of personal financial gain, to maintain litigation benefiting
all the people of the state, while the opposition characterized the bill
as encouraging “use of environmental protection machinery as a
delaying, obstructive tactic.”
By rejecting the proposed open door policy, the Legislature made
clear that some limitation on standing to challenge administrative
action was appropriate.
Soc'y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (N.Y.
1991) (citations omitted).
211. See, e.g., Samuelsen v. Walder, 907 N.Y.S.2d 784, 791 (Sup. Ct. 2010),
rev’d, 932 N.Y.S.2d 30 (App. Div. 2011) (“In the non-SEQRA context, New York
courts have taken a broader view of both individual and associational standing
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insinuated discomfort with the stringency of Society of Plastics.212
New York courts have hinted and other jurisdictions have
zealously proclaimed that concerned and potentially impacted
citizens should be able to defend essential public natural
resources such as underground aquifers. California’s public
interest exemption to the right of mandamus suggests one
potential means by which critical public resources may be
guarded in cases where “special harm” has not occurred and
therefore cannot be pleaded. In light of the judiciary’s awareness
surrounding Society of Plastics’ harmful grip on environmental
litigation, the judiciary can certainly call upon precedent, policy,
common sense, and a tragically lengthening list of unconsidered
environmental destruction to overturn Society of Plastics and
restore SEQRA’s lost promise to New Yorkers’ reality.

VI. POTENTIAL LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK STATE
If New York’s courts demur from toppling Society of Plastics’
reign over SEQRA, there exist plenty of admirable models on
which the New York State Legislature can base a new citizen suit

to challenges to governmental action and inaction . . . . The argument that
individual petitioners did not allege a special, individualized harm, different
from that of the public at large, is misplaced.”).
212. In Application of Committee to Preserve Brighton Beach & Manhattan
Beach, the court overturned the IAS court and found that the petitioners had
standing when they alleged construction of a concession stand in a park would
“interfere with their use and enjoyment of the park, reduce the area of open
space in the park, cause noise and traffic problems, cause contaminants to be
released into the air and obstruct their views of the park from their building.”
Application of Comm. to Pres. Brighton Beach & Manhattan Beach v. Planning
Comm’n, 695 N.Y.S.2d 7, 11 (App. Div. 1999). In determining that the
petitioners established “close proximity” to the site of the planned concession
stand, the court made no mention of Society of Plastics. Id. The court backed up
its claim by repeating a telling assertion from, of all cases, Sun-Brite: “Standing
principles, which are in the end matters of policy, should not be heavy-handed
. . . it is desirable that land use disputes be resolved on their own merits rather
than by preclusive, restrictive standing rules.” Id. at 12 (quoting Sun-Brite Car
Wash, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning & Appeals, 508 N.E.2d 130, 133 (N.Y. 1987)). Again,
a New York court's understanding of policy objectives seems at odds with Society
of Plastics, especially its special harm requirement.
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provision for SEQRA.213 Michigan offers the most promising
example. Not only has MEPA proved to be successful in Michigan,
but it has also been considered a worthy template for other states
seeking to protect environmental interests through adoption of a
citizen suit provision.214 A citizen suit in New York should not
demand citizen participation in earlier administrative
procedures, but at the same time should adopt practical
restrictions on lawsuits for the purpose of maintaining judicial
efficiency. New York’s citizen suit provision would offer judicial
review through an Article 78 proceeding. The provision would
explicitly set forth the citizen petitioner’s right to protect the
environmental resources of New York while expanding potential
targets from government actors and corporations215 to other
private parties, thereby more fully embracing the range of
environmentally-harmful actors. The potential language of such a
citizen suit provision might read as follows:
(1) Any person may maintain an action in the Supreme Court
having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is
likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against any
person for the protection of the environment.
(2) For purposes of this section, “environment” is defined by § 80105 (State Environmental Quality Review Act).216

213. The New York State Assembly has previously expressed its discomfort
with the Society of Plastics test through passing two bills, the Environmental
Access to Justice Act and the Private Environmental Law Enforcement Act. The
Environmental Access to Justice Act specifically addressed Society of Plastics by
removing the special harm requirement. Assemb. A03423, 2009 Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2009). The Private Environmental Law Enforcement Act was a more
expansive solution, setting forth a statutory private cause of action to contest
government-approved activities harmful to the environment regardless of
whether or not the challenger suffered special harm. Assemb. A04272, 2009
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009). The Senate, however, has hitherto declined to
take up the Assembly bills.
214. See supra pp. 13-33.
215. See Weidenfeld v. Keppler, 82 N.Y.S. 634, 635-36 (App. Div. 1903). A
corporation is currently considered a quasi-governmental body for purposes of
Article 78 party status because it relies on the state for its charter. See id. at
635-36.
216. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(6) (McKinney 2013) (“‘Environment’
means the physical conditions which will be affected by a proposed action,
including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, objects of historic or
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(3) For purposes of this section, a “person” shall include any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, government
entity, or other legal entity whose interests fall within the stated
purposes of § 8-0101 and whose stated injury harms those
interests.
(4) As a condition precedent to the institution of an action
pursuant to paragraph (1), the complaining party shall first file
with the governmental agencies or authorities charged by law
with the duty of regulating or prohibiting the act or conduct
complained of a verified complaint setting forth the facts upon
which the complaint is based and the manner in which the
complaining party is affected. Upon receipt of a complaint, the
governmental agency or authority shall forthwith transmit, by
registered or certified mail, a copy of such complaint to those
parties charged with violating the laws, rules, and regulations for
the environment. The agency receiving such complaint shall have
30 days after the receipt thereof within which to take appropriate
action. If such action is not taken within the time prescribed, the
complaining party may institute the judicial proceedings
authorized in paragraph (1). However, failure to comply with this
subsection shall not bar an action for a temporary restraining
order to prevent immediate and irreparable harm from the
conduct or activity complained of.
(5) Paragraph (4) shall not apply if the act or conduct complained
of is not subject to regulation or prohibition by a government
agency or authority.

Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) borrow MEPA’s language217 while
inserting the zone of interests protected by SEQRA. Paragraph
(4) borrows Florida’s limitations on the citizen suit.218 De
minimis environmental damage will be deemed insufficient as a
qualifying
injury
through
the
discretion
of
courts.
Pennsylvania219 and Minnesota220 have both demonstrated that

aesthetic significance, existing patterns of population concentration,
distribution, or growth, and existing community or neighborhood character.”).
217. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701 (2011).
218. See FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (2014).
219. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, the Attorney General, through invoking the environmental right
contained in Pennsylvania’s constitution, sought to enjoin the construction of an
observation tower on Gettysburg Battlefield. Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/1

54

1_Butzel&Thimmayya

Final REVISED

2015]

THE TYRANNY OF PLASTICS

8/24/2015 12:03 PM

55

courts can distinguish actionable damage from de minimis
damage even in a setting where standing requirements are
relaxed to protect the environment. It is worth noting that under
the proposed citizen suit provision environmental non-profits will
have standing to bring suit under the proposed language so long
as they can prove that their interests fall within that of SEQRA
and they allege injures to those interests. Gone is the
unreasonable necessity of proving an individual member of the
organization suffers special harm.
Whether through judicial reform or legislative action, the
writing is on the wall for environmental standing in New York
State. Considering more effective rules in other states, insights of
New York courts, and perverse holdings that contradict the
purposes of SEQRA, it is plain that New York deserves more
reasonable standing requirements and is perfectly capable of
delivering such reform to its people.

Battlefield Tower, 302 A.2d 886, 887 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002). The court
cautioned that:
It is difficult to conceive of any human activity that does not in some
degree impair the natural, scenic and esthetic values of any
environment. If the standard of injury to historic values is to be that
expressed by the Commonwealth's witnesses as an “intrusion” or
“distraction,” it becomes difficult to imagine any activity in the
vicinity of Gettysburg which would not unconstitutionally harm its
historic values. This, of course, indicates why elements of State
government other than the judiciary should, as by Article I, Section
27 [the constitutional environmental right] they are empowered to
do, establish reasonable regulations for the preservation,
conservation and maintenance of the peoples' resources.
Id. at 895. Though the court found that the Attorney General had standing, the
validity of administrative discretion was recognized. Id. at 893-94.
220. See supra pp. 22-25.
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